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The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
THOMAS G. KRATIENMAKER" 
President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act of 19961 
("1996 Act," "new Act," or "Act'') on February 8, 1996.2 By that time, 
the spin masters were already in high gear, heaping superlatives on the 
bill. Clinton said the new Act was ''truly revolutionary legislation that 
will bring the future to our doorstep."3 I hope here to provide a some-
what more sober assessment of the bill. After all, a statute that defines 
''telecommunications" in a manner such that it includes the act of mail-
ing a letter or throwing a newspaper on the lawn, cannot be all that 
special.4 
Two features of this article should be noted at the outset because 
they somewhat limit its scope. First, every sentence in the remainder of 
this article is (at least a bit of) an over-generalization. This is a warn-
• Dean and Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. I wish to thanJc Tom 
Koonce for his research assistance and F. John Barker for his edllorlal assistance. I am grate-
fol to participants in the AA1S Mass Media Law workshop and the William and Mary School 
of Law Colloquium series. I also ll'ish to point out that at note /9S infra I disclose a minor, 
potential conflict of interest 
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. I 04-104, II 0 Stat 56 (to be codified at 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
2. Mike Mills, Ushering in a New Age in Communications: Clinton Signs 'Rel·olutlonary' 
Bill into Law at a Ceremony Packed with Symbolism, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1996, at Cl. 
3. President William J. Clinton, Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Telecommunica-
tions Act Conference Report (Feb. 8, 1996) (text of speech can be found at White House 
Home Page (virtual libnuy) http://lwww.whitehouse.gov/\VHnttmlllibnuy.html). 
4. "The term 'telecommunications' means the transmission, between or among points speci-
fied by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without chl!.llge in the form or content 
of the information as sent and received." See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3(a)(2), add-
ing 47 U.S.C. § 153(r)(48). 
As written, this section describes equally well a person mailing a letter l!.lld the same 
person sending a fax or telephoning and leaving a message on the recipient's answering ma-
chine. 
123 
124 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:123 
ing, not a boast. The 1996 Act is a very lengthy and very detailed bill. 
Fonnally written as a series of amendments and additions to the Feder-
al Communications Commission's ("FCC" or "Commission") basic 
charter, the Communications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"),5 the committee 
print of the law is Ill pages long. Major changes are made in the law 
affecting regulation of broadcasting, both radio and television, as well 
as cable and telephony. Less extensive alterations occur in satellite and 
spectrum regulation and in the FCC's own processes. 
Given the new Act's breadth and depth, no article about it can be 
simultaneously and consistently readable, fully comprehensive, and 
utterly complete. If one is to say helpful or sensible things about the 
1996 Act, one must to some extent speak broadly. Nevertheless, I re-
main quite sensitive to the charge that this article may appear to con-
tain more pontificating than analysis; I hope that citations to underlying 
research, much of which I conducted myself, will further help to con-
vince the reader that I have thought about these issues seriously.6 
Second, for the most part, what the article says takes for granted 
the utility of a federal communications commission. This is not an idle 
point. The 1996 Act does no more than did the 1934 Act (or its prede-
cessor, the Radio Act of 19277) to explain a fundamental, but very 
contestable, policy choice that underlies U.S. regulation of telecommu-
nications markets: Congress decided, in 19278 and again in 1934,9 to 
regulate these markets through an industry-specific federal commission. 
No other medium of communication in this country is regulated in this 
fashion; we have no Federal Computer Commission or Federal Newspa-
per Commission, no Federal Internet Agency or National Institute of 
Theatrical Productions. There may, indeed, be good reasons why Con-
gress created the FCC rather than simply subjecting owners of broad-
cast stations, cable systems, and telephone wires and switches to laws 
of general applicability - such as antitrust, labor and securities laws. 
5. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 
151-610). 
6. See THOMAS G. KRATIENMAKER, TELECOMM. LAW & POLICY {1994) (hereinafter TLP). 
When I cite to this casebook, I am usually citing to primary sources, or to the research work 
of others, as well. See also THOMAS G. KRATIENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING 
BROADCASTING PROGRAMMING (1994) (hereinafter RBP); STANLEY M. BENSEN ET AL., 
MISREGULATING TELEVISION: NETWORK DoMINANCE AND THE FCC {1984) (hereinafter MTV]. 
7. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat 1162, repealed by Communications 
Act of 1934, 48 Stat 1064. 
8. TLP, supra note 6, at 11-17. 
9. /d. at 20-21. 
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But we do not know what these reasons are; we do know they are not 
self -evident. 
One has to choose, then, between criticizing U.S. telecommunica-
tions law from within or without. Criticism from within would ask 
whether the 1996 Act is a good thing, given the presence and purposes 
of the FCC. Analysis from without would question whether the 1996 
Act cogently identifies and then remedies defects in pre-existing, indus-
try-neutral law as it would apply to telecommunications firms or mar-
kets. In this article, I choose largely to criticize from within the exist-
ing paradigm, although I drop this constraint in the conclusion. To take 
a concrete example, when Congress writes anti-monopoly provisions for 
certain telecommunications markets only and entrusts enforcement of 
them to the FCC, I do not ask in this article why the matter was not 
left to other federal agencies enforcing general antitrust principles. 
Rather, I ask only whether Congress seems to have devised wise rules, 
as they apply to the markets at issue. 
I. STATIJS QUO ANTE 
What was the problem? Why did Congress think a major overhaul 
of much of the telecommunications act was in order? What is the con-
text within which we should read the 1996 Act? The answer, in two 
phrases, is "technological convergence" and "legal balkanization." 
A. Technological Convergence 
"Telecommunications" is, quite simply, the electronic transmission 
of information (in audio, video, or simple data form). 10 The electronic 
data transmission is encoded at the sending end so that it may flow 
through the ether (the electromagnetic spectrum) at the speed of light 
or through wires (copper, coaxial cable, fiber optic, whatever) at very 
rapid speeds. 11 At the receiving end, the encoded information is decod-
ed.lz 
As this simple description shows, telecommunications has value to 
people because it can transmit information very quickly and over long 
distances. 13 In this regard, telecommunications is, except for its elec-
10. /d. at 29-31. 
11. Jd. at 30-31. 
12. /d. at 30-31. 
13. In many cases, telecommunications transmissions can also be rendered (rclnlivcly) secure 
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tronic features, like smoke signals.14 These, too, are data transmission 
systems that carry information, encoded on one end and decoded at the 
other, at the speed of light. Telecommunications technology is largely 
regarded as an advancement over smoke signal technology because it 
can carry more information per second, carry it a greater distance, and 
provide more security against surreptitious monitoring. 15 
Thus, when Morse, Bell, and Marconi invented the telegraph, tele-
phone, and wireless transmitter respectively, each pushed us further 
along a path already trod. What they added to the process of informa-
tion transfer was the use of electrical energy to drive the system. 
All this was comparatively new when Congress wrote the Commu-
nications Act of 1934. Everything seemed much simpler then. Electron-
ic communications moved through either the air or wires. 16 
The market for communications through wires was a natural mo-
nopoly - who ever heard of two communications wires going into the 
same house? - and so the telephone and telegraph (after which the 
monopolist AT&T was named) were to be regulated as common car-
riers. Accordingly, those who wrote Title II of the 1934 Act essentially 
copied from the Interstate Commerce Act the then-standard features of 
public utility regulation and subjected telegraphy and telephony (i.e., 
AT &n to such oversight. 17 
Conversely, electronic communication through the spectrum was 
broadcasting. This market was dominated by three radio networks 
(owned by two firms, CBS and NBC)18 and so the task of regulation 
was to choose ''the worthiest" applicants for stations and then to let 
them compete for listeners' attention.19 This competition would be kept 
within the bounds of good taste by the Commission's oversight of 
programming practices.20 
In 1934, then, telecommunications were characterized by technologi-
cal balkanization. Telecommunication by wire was a natural monopoly, 
from eavesdroppers, thus increasing their value. 
14. The smoke signal analogy is suggested by DoN L. CANNON & GERALD LUECKE, UN· 
DERSTANDING COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS l (2d ed. 1984). 
15. TLP, supra note 6, at 29. 
16. See id. at 20. 
17. Milton Mueller, Universal Service in Telephone History, TELECOMM. POL'Y, July 1993, 
at 354. 
18. See NE1WORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FCC, NEW TELEVISION NE1WORKS: ENTRY, JU-
RISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION VOL. 11 49-59 (1980) [hereinafter NISS VOL. 11]. 
19. TLP, supra note 6, at 20 & 77-84. 
20. /d. at 14-17. 
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subject to common carrier regulation, characterized by speaker and 
listener privacy and virtually devoid of censorship. Telecommunication 
through the air was broadcasting, a conversation open to everyone, 
conducted through workable competitive markets, while censored by the 
FCC. 
That was then. What is now? The perception of technological 
balkanization has yielded to the reality of technological convergence. 
Since the 1934 Act, we have witnessed satellites, microwave, television, 
computers (with their transistors and microprocessors), fiber optics, and 
the World Wide Web. These have shattered our previous illusion of 
tightly compartmentalized technologies. 
Today, most Americans receive their television programming over a 
wire, the medium we call "cable television."21 Millions of telephone 
calls every day in the U.S. are broadcast from cellular (mobile) tele-
phones.22 It would probably be impossible, and certainly difficult, to 
define today the difference between a telephone and a computer. To-
morrow, it will be equally challenging to distinguish a television set 
with a VCR and a cable connection from a computer with a monitor, 
CD-ROM, and a good modem. 
In short, telecommunications technology is converging. More pre-
cisely, as illustrated by the preceding examples, we are witnessing a 
convergence of devices accompanied by a plethora of transmission 
paths. The telecommunications receiver is a radio, computer, television, 
telephone, VCR, and fax machine all rolled into one. We can get infor-
mation to such devices by broadcast, microwave, satellite, tape or disk, 
copper wire, or optic fiber.23 
B. Legal Balkanization 
Confronting, and obstructing, these technological developments were 
(and, to some extent, still are) a series of governmentally imposed entry 
barriers that sought to force the new and the old technologies into a 
Procrustean bed. These barriers attempted both to confine certain devic-
es to certain limited uses and to limit the transmission paths telecom-
munications providers might employ. 
21. /d. at 24-25. 
22. U.S. Subscriber Base Increases by 36 Percent, MOBILE PHONE NEVlS, Mnr. 25, 1996, 
no. 13, vol. 14, ISSN: 0737-5077. 
23. See TLP, supra note 6, at 29-35. 
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For example, all of these assertions were true at the end of 1995 
(and some still are): television stations cannot operate local cable sys-
tems;24 but cable systems must carry television stations.25 (On the other 
hand, firms sending multiple television signals to the home via satellite 
are effectively prevented from carrying network television stations.26) 
Telephone companies cannot offer cable television27 - and cable televi-
sion companies cannot offer telephonf8 - although both run wires for 
electronic communications into the same houses. In several states, al-
most everyone except the incumbent phone company is barred from 
offering telephone service to residential subscribers.29 Here is one Rube 
Goldberg might have admired: most local telephone companies cannot 
offer long distance service/0 nor can they manufacture31 (although they 
can sell)32 telecommunications equipment, but they can sell real estate/3 
although they may not offer cable television programming,34 unless they 
neither select nor own the programs.35 Broadcast stations may also use 
their frequencies to transmit some information to private, paying sub-
scribers but only types of information authorized by the FCC.36 
Why did we encounter all these entry barriers? Usually, for one of 
two reasons. The first, and most frequent explanation, is that we (claim 
to) fear predation. The issue of telephone entry into cable illustrates the 
two kinds of predation feared, discriminatory interconnection and preda-
tory cross-subsidization. If telephone companies are allowed to offer 
cable television, it is said, they will be in a uniquely advantageous 
position to prey against their cable rivals. First, telephone companies 
could raise their cable rivals' costs by denying cable equal access to 
24. 47 C.F.R § 76.50l(a)(2) (1996). 
25. TLP, supra note 6, at 354-76. 
26. Section 119 of the Copyright Act gives satellite providers the practically necessary "com-
pulsory license" for network stations only in those few areas not served by conventional or 
cable television. See 17 U.S.C. § 119 (1996). 
27. TLP, supra note 6, at 565-87. 
28. /d. 
29. See, e.g., In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, 1996 FCC LEXIS 2063, ~ 5 (Apr. 16, 1996). 
30. TLP, supra note 6, at 543-53 (citing United States v. Westevil Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283 
(D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911 (1990). 
31. TLP, supra note 6, at 543-53. 
32. /d. at 507-08. 
33. /d. at 544. 
34. /d. at 565-87. 
35. /d. at 565-87. 
36. ld. at 55-58. 
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necessary facilities, such as pole attachments.37 I refer to this tactic 
generically as discriminatory interconnection. Second, while raising their 
cable rivals' costs, the telephone companies (telcos) could simultaneous-
ly artificially underprice their cable rivals by hiding costs of telcos' 
cable services in the costs of providing telephone dial tones. I call this 
tactic predatory cross-subsidization.38 
A second, less frequently voiced, justification for legal balkanization 
of telecommunications is that we (claim to) fear disruption of a system 
of pro-social internal cross-subsidies. Local, residential phone subscrip-
tion rates are as low as they are not because costs are that low but 
because we force the phone companies to jack up business rates in 
order to depress residential rates.39 Taking money from businesses and 
giving it to consumers is said to be pro-social, regardless of the relative 
costs of the services involved. If we permit cable systems to offer 
phone service, they will just target the business users. This "cream 
skimming" will deny phone companies the wherewithal to subsidize 
residents' rates, which will therefore increase. Taking money from con-
sumers and giving it to businesses is said to be anti-social, regardless 
of the relative costs of the services involved. 
C. Motives for the 1996 Act 
From the vantage point just sketched out, we can discern the key 
reasons for the 1996 Act. I believe Congress and other opinion leaders 
reached three overriding conclusions about telecommunications law and 
policy that underlie the core of the new Act. 
First, a consensus formed that the issue(s) of technological conver-
gence should be answered more commonly by marketplace forces, less 
frequently by regulatory fiat. Policy makers believe (or profess to be-
lieve) that if telephony, radio, and television are to merge -or not to 
merge - that result should be driven by consumers making choices in 
open markets that express their preferences. Regulation is at most a 
second best method for deciding who will offer what telecommunica-
37. This is what Steve Salop and 1 call the "bottleneck" method or raising rivals' costs. See 
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anlicompetith·e Exclusion: Raising Rr;a/s' Costs to 
Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209, 234-36 (1986). 
38. This is a sophisticated, or special case of, predatory pricing. Unlike most a11eged preda-
tory pricing schemes, this one does not require the sacrifice or profits in the short run. For a 
fuller discussion see TI..P, supra note 6, at 510-12 & 514-23. 
39. /d. at 467. 
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tions services to whom. 
As noted, however, unleashing market forces might also just lead to 
monopolistic predation rather than open bazaars in which many firms 
flourish. Accompanying the conclusion that we should subject conver-
gence issues to the marketplace, then, was the conclusion that predation 
could (perhaps must) be avoided by appropriate regulatory oversight. 
The FCC's job description needed to be rewritten. The agency should 
not decide who could enter what markets, but rather should monitor the 
conditions under which such entry took place and the responses to such 
entry by those already there ("entrenched interests," if you prefer).40 
Tear down entry barriers, but replace them with specific regulatory 
instruments to hu.nt down predators. 
Were this the entire story, it would be comparatively simple to 
retell. Indeed, we might then note that the 1996 Act was, at bottom, 
just an extension of the philosophy underlying the 1983 antitrust con-
sent decree pursuant to which AT&T was broken into several parts.41 
But a third policy conclusion, beyond the preference for competition 
among technologies monitored by predator hunters, also deeply affects 
the new Act. 
That conclusion is the continuing conviction that markets for tele-
communications services ought to be governmentally managed so that 
they provide - and to some extent conceal - pro-social cross-subsi-
dies. Baldly stated, non-predatory competition is not good if it leads to 
higher residential subscription rates for basic telephone services. Com-
petition among broadcasters should not be permitted to generate a tele-
vision system that does not provide closed-captioning, without charge, 
to everyone, or that does provide too much violence or talk about sex. 
Think, then, of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as an effort to 
hit a legislative trifecta:42 (1) Entry barriers will be torn down so that 
legal balkanization no longer stands in the path of technological conver-
gence. (2) As cross-cutting entry subsequently takes place all over the 
telecommunications field, the FCC will be charged with ferreting out 
predators and given special regulatory tools for this task. (3) Lest the 
new competition harm the most vulnerable, pro-social43 cross-subsidies 
40. As we shall see, it is this conclusion especially that accounts for the fact that the new 
Act is just about as much regulatory as it is deregulatory in its provisions and effects. 
41. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), a.if'd 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
42. As explained in greater detail below, these three goals are not easily compatible with 
each other. Some of the law's less satisfactory aspects arise from its attempts to achieve simul-
taneously inconsistent goals. 
43. I assume it is clear by now (if there was ever any doubt) that one cannot determine 
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will be maintained and even added to the value produced by telecom-
munications firms and markets.44 
II. HEADLINERS 
Specifically, what did the 1996 Act do? An abbreviated version of 
it is appended to this Article, but I edited over half the words out of 
the Act to produce the appendix. Here, I am even less detailed, trying 
to identify the major changes and to do so in reasonably brief fashion. 
A. Controls over Industry Structure and Commercial Practices 
The FCC has regulated telecommunications markets through con-
trols imposed on industry structure or commercial practices (process 
regulations) much more frequently than it has imposed content (or out-
come) regulations. Many headlines about the Act emphasized its censor-
ship features, discussed below, but most of its provisions affect industry 
structure and commercial activity. 
1. Radio 
The 1996 Act drops all limits on the number of AM and FM radio 
station licenses that any owner may control nationwide.45 It also sub-
stantially raises the number of stations that may be commonly owned in 
any one market, varying the multiple ownership limit with the size of 
the market.46 Of course, antitrust law continues to supply an upper limit 
on station consolidation. 
whether a cross-subsidy is "pro-social" without fust mnking importmt, subjective value judg-
ments, such as whether services should be provided below cost or how much v;e dislike gratu-
itous 1V violence. 
44. I am speaking here, of course, of the 1996 Act as it \\ill be described in law, which 
requires that a public-regarding purpose be articulated as the basis for the statute. See, e.g., the 
discussion of "rational basis review" in GEOFFREY R. STONE ET. AL., CossnnmoNAL LAw 
532-38 (2d. ed. 1991). Outside courts of law, many better (or more interesting) ways to llllll-
lyze the Act might be employed. For example, one might compare the sources and amounts of 
political action committee ("PAC") donations with fmal provisions in the Bill. Senators and 
Representatives may have voted for the Act out of a conviction that this was the best way to 
maximize their PAC contributions, their chances for reelection, or their likelihood of immortali-
ty, but these are beside the point of this article. 
45. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(a), modifying 47 C.F.R. 73.3555 (1996). 
46. /d. § 202(b)(1), modifying 47 C.F.R. 73.3555 (1996). The new Act also changes, but 
less drastically, the group ownership rules applicable to television. /d. § 202(c), modfh·ing 47 
C.F.R. 73.3555 (1996). 
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2. Television 
The next big development in television is expected to be the arrival 
of high definition television (HDTV).47 This new method of propagating 
television signals produces a much clearer, richer, more textured picture 
- akin to what one sees watching a 35mm film in a movie theater. 
HDTV signals, however, are incompatible with conventional televi-
sion signals and so must be transmitted on a different frequency and 
cannot be decoded by conventional television sets. This creates a real 
transition problem: how does one offer HDTV without forcing all view-
ers to buy new sets right away't8 
Several years ago, the FCC decided that it should manage the pro-
cess of transition from conventional to HDTV technology and that con-
ventional television broadcasters should take the lead in implementing 
HDTV. Conventional U.S. television stations broadcast in either the 
VHF (very high frequency) spectrum, where we locate channels 2-13, 
or the UHF (ultra high frequency) spectrum, where we locate channels 
20-70. The agency determined that it could scrounge up enough UHF 
spectrum to give almost every existing full-strength television VHF or 
UHF broadcaster another 6 MHz, the bandwidth presently assigned for 
each television station. The Commission's initial plan was that each 
broadcaster would be offered an additional channel, on which it could 
broadcast HDTV, and that at some future time - presumably after 
most U.S. households had acquired HDTV sets - broadcasters would 
then be required to surrender one of their channels. 
Two things happened shortly after that initial plan was announced. 
(1) The Commission started auctioning off spectrum that was being 
newly devoted to new common carrier technologies and the bidding 
went through the roof.49 Politicians became enamored of the idea that 
47. Unless otherwise indicated the data presented here with respect to HDTV may all be 
found at 1LP, supra note 6, at 281-93. 
48. The puzzle is thus like that faced by the FCC when it moved the FM radio band. /d. 
All FM broadcasters' equipment became obsolete overnight and consumers had no radios (de-
coders) that could receive the new FM signals. The FM industry became a weak step-sister to 
the AM radio industry instantly and stayed that way for over two decades. See SYDNEY W. 
HEAD & CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING, BROADCASTING IN AMERICA 152-53 (1982). The puzzle is 
not like that faced by the Commission when color television was introduced. One does not 
need a color-equipped set to receive a color-encoded signal. Consumers do not need color re-
ceivers to decode transmissions of programs that are coded for color. 
49. See Mike Allen, Wireless Systems Put Out Their Antennas, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1996 
at A29; see also George Graham, U.S. Broadband License Bids Start Today: Government Hopes 
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spectrum auctions might materially reduce the national debt.50 (2) Digi-
tal technology overtook analog technology and it is now agreed that 
any HDTV transmissions will be digital.51 The 6 MHz channels will 
therefore be quite ample to broadcast four or five conventional signal~2 
at once or HDTV plus some other types of information or two HDTV 
signals.53 Putting (1) and (2) together made some people realize the 
enormity of the give-away the FCC had proposed. 
The 1996 Act essentially protects the deal the broadcasters first 
wrung out of the Commission. Congress instructs the FCC that if the 
agency decides ''to issue additional licenses for advanced television 
services,"54 it "should limit the initial eligibility for such licenses,55 to 
existing television broadcasters. Since one cannot conduct an auction 
with only one bidder, this ends the auction idea.56 
3. Broadcasting 
Two features of the new Act combine to grant virtually perpetual 
licenses to all radio and television stations. The basic term for all 
for World's Largest Auction of Public Assets in Forthcoming Wlrele.u Persoll!ll Telecoms Sell-
off, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 6, 1994, at 7. 
50. See Edmund L. Andrews, Digital Tv. Dollars and Dissent; The Political Battle Grows 
over the Use of New Broadcast Technology, N.Y. TIMES, Mnr. 18, 1996, at Dl; see also Paul 
Farhi Clinton Proposes Radio Spectrum Auction; Benefits for Dejicfl, New Communications 
Technologies Seen, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1993, at 812. 
51. See Tom Foremski, The Key Challenge Is Price • The Cost of Digital Televlslon Sets 
Will Come Dov:n in Price as New Chips Are Dl!l·eloped, FIN. TIMES, 1\inr. 6, 1996, at XI. 
52. Paul Farhi, FCC Gathering to Decide on Fate of HDTV; Broadcasters Want Alnrcn-es 
for W"ueless Communications, WASH. POST, July 27, 1995, at 89. 
53. FCC Chainnan Reed Hundt, Speech at the Museum of Television & Rndio (June 6, 
1996) (transcript available in < http://www.fcc.gov/Specches/Hundtlsprch626.bct> ). 
54. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 201, adding 41 U.S.C. § 336(a). 
SS. !d. § 201, adding 41 U.S.C. § 336(a)(l). 
56. There is an infonnal agreement in Congress that the issue of whether to auction HDTV 
channels may be revisited in the next year. Inertia suggests there will be no auctions. So does 
the extraordinazy political clout broadcasters possess. However, the broadcasters did not get 
everything they may have wished for in this section of the AcL Other provisions tell the Com-
mission to allow the holders of the new HDlV licenses to offer "ancilliuy or supplemental" 
services, (see id. § 201, adding 41 U.S.C. § 336(a)(2)) but to collect a fee (roughly equivalent 
to what an auction would have brought) for any services for which the licensee charges. (See 
id. § 201, adding 41 U.S.C. § 336(e)(1).) Additionally, if the FCC docs give cac:h broadcaster 
an extra channel it must require that, at some appropriate time, either the original or the addi-
tional license be surrendered. (See id. § 201, adding 41 U.S.C. § 336(c).) 
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broadcasting licenses is extended to eight years.57 Additionally, at re-
newal time, the Commission must grant the application of the incum-
bent broadcaster if the agency finds that the licensee "served the public 
interest,"58 committed "no serious violations"59 of the Communications 
Act or of the FCC's rules, and has not committed any other violations 
"which, taken together, would constitute a pattern of abuse.'x;o Only if 
the incumbent-applicant flunks one of these tests61 and only if the 
Commission then determines that a sanction short of non-renewal is not 
appropriate may the Commission consider an outsider's application.62 
Comparative hearings in which an incumbent is an applicant have pro-
duced volumes of legal wrangling, but almost no license denials.63 Now 
such hearings are a thing of the past. 
4. Cable 
The new Act makes two major changes in cable regulation. One 
reduces entry barriers. The other sunsets some rate regulation. 
a. Reduced Entry Barriers 
In 1984, Congress passed the Cable Communications Policy Act, 
prohibiting telephone companies ("telcos") from offering cable television 
service directly to subscribers in their service areas.64 Subsequent FCC 
interpretations of this law, embedded in the agency's so-called ''video 
dial tone" rules, had substantially narrowed the force of the cable/telco 
ban. 65 The rules permitted phone companies to offer distinct cable tele-
57. /d. §203, amending 47 U.S.C. § 307(c){I). 
58. /d. § 204(a)(I), adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(I)(A). 
59. ld. § 204(a)(l), adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(I)(B). 
60. /d. § 204(a)(I), adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(l)(C). 
61. /d. § 204(a)(I), adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(I). 
62. /d. § 204(a)(I), adding 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(2). 
63. TLP, supra note 6, at 89-120. 
64. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat 2779 (1984). See also TLP, supra note 6, at 567. This Is 
a classic example of the "legal balkanization" discussed above. Congress feared that telephone 
companies might be able to prey successfully against cable systems and so banned their partici-
pation in cable television. Meanwhile, converging technologies made it more and more difficult 
to determine just what was "cable television programming" and what was "telephone service" 
(Consider, for example, video images transmitted over the Internet). 
65. TLP, supra note 6, at 567-87. 
1996] THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 135 
vision services to their customers if the companies operated on a com-
mon carrier basis, not selecting the programming they transmitted. The 
video dial tone rules, however, prohibited phone companies from offer-
ing cable services in their service area if the telco played a major role 
in choosing the programming on its system.66 
The 1996 Act repeals both the telco ban67 and the FCC's video dial 
tone rules,68 replacing the old scheme with one that allows telephone 
companies (or anyone else) to offer cable television while these new 
entrants also choose from a menu of regulatory options as to how they 
will be regulated.69 New cable companies (or "multi-video program 
distributors" (MVPD) as the FCC likes to call them) may operate like, 
and be regulated as, broadcasters70 or common carriers71 or cable com-
panies72 or as something new: open video systems73 (which bear a strik-
ing resemblance to video dial tone systems)."' 
b. Sunsetting (Some) Rate Regulation 
Perhaps in part because Congress had kept telephone companies 
from offering competition to cable systems, Congress found in 1992 
that cable systems enjoyed monopoly power. So Congress heaped on 
more regulation, in this case price regulation of cable services.75 The 
1992 Cable Act required every cable system that was not subject to 
effective competition76 to divide its services into a basic tier, a cable 
programming tier, and other services such as pay per view or pay per 
channel. 
The latter, such as HBO or Showtime, receive no rate regulation 
66. /d. 
67. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 302(b)(l), repealing 41 U.S.C. § 533(b). 
68. /d. § 302(b)(3). 
69. /d. § 302(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 651(a). 
70. /d. § 302(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 651(a)(2). 
71. /d. § 302(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 651(a)(2). 
72. /d. § 302(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 6S1(a)(3). 
73. /d. § 302(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 6S1(a)(4). 
74. See, e.g., /d. § 302(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 6S1(b)(l). 
75. lLP, supra note 6, at 442-60. 
76. "Effective competition" was defmed so that few cable systems were subject to it and 
therefore exempt from rate regulation. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competi-
tion Act of 1992, Pub. 1- No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460. 
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under the 1992 Act. 77 Rates for the basic tier, essentially retransmitted 
local stations plus public access channels and imported super-stations 
(e.g., WTBS, WGN), are regulated by states or localities following 
rules set down by the FCC. 78 Rules for an intennediate tier, what I call 
the cable programming tier, which contains the cable networks for 
which viewers are not charged separately79 (such as 1NT, MTV, ESPN, 
BET), are regulated by the FCC. 80 
The 1996 Act, as it unleashes telephone companies into the cable 
market, also unshackles existing cable systems from rate regulation of 
their cable programming tiers as of 1999.81 If all goes according to 
Congress' plan (or hope), moreover, even more rate deregulation will 
occur. Cable rate regulation of any sort is authorized only when the 
cable system is not subject to "effective competition."82 The Act treats 
as subject to "effective competition" any cable system that confronts a 
real rival in its market. 83 If telephone companies (or other utilities, such 
as electrical or water or gas, that also run lines into our homes) suc-
cessfully initiate cable services, then both the incumbent companies and 
the newcomers will be subject to "effective competition" and therefore 
freed of rate regulation. 84 
5. Telephones 
As just mentioned, the 1996 Act frees telcos to enter cable televi-
sion markets in any (non-predatory) manner they see fit. The new Act 
makes three other major changes in the regulation of telephone services. 
To understand the first two, one must first know the basics of the 1983 
consent decree that divested AT&T of its local operating companies. 
77. TLP, supra note 6, at 442. 
78. /d. 
79. Viewers do pay for most of these services, but not separately. Rather, each cable pro-
gram network usually charges the cable operator a set fee per month per subscriber and the 
cable system that carries that network then sets the fee for its cable programming tier high 
enough to cover those charges. Think of the non-basic and non-per-channel part of your cable 
line-up as one gigantic tie-in, if you will (Well it's better than thinking of how to write one 
sentence that contains frve hyphenated words!). 
80. TLP, supra note 6, at 442. 
81. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 301(b)(I)(C), adding 41 U.S.C. § 543(c)(4). 
82. TLP, supra note 6, at 442. 
83. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 301(b)(3), amending 41 U.S.C. § 543(1)(1). 
84. /d. § 301(b)(3)(C), adding 41 U.S.C. § 543(1)(1)(0). 
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The consent decree (or modified final judgment or ''MFJ")85 rested 
on the premise that the Bell System had used the power of its monopo-
ly local exchange carriers ("LECs") to gain power in markets that 
could have been competitive, such as providing long distance services 
or manufacturing phones, switches, and wires.86 Accordingly, the MFJ 
(1) took its LECs away from AT&T, and (2) set AT&T largely free 
from regulation to compete in long-distance and equipment markets,87 
while (3) preventing these newly divorced Bell operating companies 
("BOCs", a sub-species of LECs - since some local phone companies 
were never formerly owned by AT&T) from getting into such markets 
as long distance and manufacturing.88 These latter restrictions, just like 
the liberation of AT&T, followed from the underlying logic of the 
consent decree:89 AT&T's power came from the LECs/BOCs; now that 
the BOCs were divorced from AT&T, AT&T could not find its old 
predatory tactics profitable, but the BOCs might adopt those tactics for 
the same reasons (and with the same successes) as had AT&T.g.o 
The 1996 Act essentially reflects two important new policy conclu-
sions about the 1983 consent decree. First, some important provisions 
of the new Act rest on the conclusion that we may be able to cut the 
Gordian knot, to avoid choosing between complete exclusion of the 
former BOCs from competitive markets or permitting entry only under 
heavy regulatory constraints. We clearly would be able to avoid this 
choice were there competition in the local loop. Perhaps if local ex-
change carriers were forced to make their switches and wires available 
to anyone who wished to offer telephone services through the LECs' 
facilities, competitive markets in the provision of telephone exchange 
services might emerge. So certain sections of the new Act promise an 
"everyone into LECs" regime, under which any firm can acquire access 
to LEC facilities to offer competitive services. (As explained below, 
these provisions apply to all local exchange carriers, not only to those 
85. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), offd 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
86. 1LP, supra note 6, at 510-13. 
87. /d. at 499-505. 
88. /d. at 505-09. 
89. /d. at 513. 
90. Please: you do not have to believe the underlying story. I lll11 not sure I do. AT&T 
may not have committed all these predatory acts. Even if it did, one BOC may not have the 
same opportunity profitably to prey, as I argue below. The point is only that the MFJ rested 
on this account of how AT&T acquired and maintained such size and breadth and on the as-
sumption that the newly created BOCs would enjoy the same opportunities that AT&T had 
exploited. 
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that formerly were Bell companies.) 
Second, other important portions of the new Act rest on the conclu-
sion that, at least until competition in the local loop becomes a reality, 
the best way to protect competitive markets - such as long distance or 
equipment manufacturing - that former Bell operating companies 
might wish to enter is not to ban BOCs' entrance into those markets, 
but to permit entry subject to regulatory constraints. Accordingly, the 
"BOCs into everything" provisions of the bill abolish all remaining line 
of business restrictions imposed by the consent decree. A panoply of 
regulatory constraints are imposed on BOCs who enter these newly 
opened markets. 
Finally, the Act also codifies for the first time the regulatory goal 
of "universal service." I discuss that section after reviewing the provi-
sions growing out of the aftermath of the consent decree. 
a. Everyone into LECs 
Many provisions of the Act are important to this point, but the key 
is new section 251, added to Title II. Entitled "Interconnection," this 
provision imposes general duties of access and nondiscrimination on 
every "telecommunications carrier''91 and each "local exchange carrier'' 
(LEC).92 More substantial obligations are imposed on "incumbent local 
exchange carriers,"93 that is, the local exchange carriers in existence 
when the act was passed. (More simply, your present local telephone 
company.) 
These incumbent LECs are required to provide, at just and reason-
able rates, interconnection with their networks for the transmission and 
routing of telephone exchange service and exchange access at any feasi-
ble point within the LECs' networks.94 They must provide nondiscrimi-
natory access at reasonable cost to network elements on an unbundled 
basis at any technically feasible point and in a manner that allows the 
requesting party to combine the network elements to provide a 
telecommunications service.95 The incumbent LECs must permit each of 
their services to be resold and must offer for sale at wholesale rates 
91. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § IOI(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 2Sl(a). 
92. /d. § IOI(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 2Sl(b). 
93. /d. § IOI{a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 2Sl(c)(l). 
94. /d. § IOI(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 2Sl(c)(2). 
95. Id. § IOI(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 2Sl(c)(3). 
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any services they offer at retail to customer-subscribers.96 They must 
provide reasonable public notice of new infonnation necessary to trans-
mit and route services over their facilities and networks.97 They must 
pennit finns seeking interconnection to locate their equipment on the 
incumbent LECs' premises (known as "collocation" to the industry).93 
In addition to these special obligations imposed on incumbent 
LECs, both incumbent and subsequent LECs are also required to pro-
vide number portabili~ (so that customers can move from one phone 
company to another, but keep their phone numbers). All LECs must 
also provide dialing parity100 (entrenched finn A and newcomer B must 
provide the same system of dialing for, say, directory assistance or long 
distance access). And all local phone companies must provide access to 
their poles, ducts, conduits, and rights of way to competing providers 
of telecommunications services.101 
What does this all mean? Simply put, every entrenched local ex-
change carrier must open its facilities up to new rivals who may em-
ploy those facilities, acquired at reasonable rates and on nondiscrimina-
tory tenns, to offer competing services. If a finn wants to offer "call 
waiting'' services to Bell Atlantic's residential subscribers, it may "inter-
connect to" any relevant parts of Bell Atlantic's system to create a call 
waiting service. The same holds for a finn that may wish to offer mes-
sage routing services to brokerage houses or to provide teleconferencing 
services within a particular city. The finn need not build that which the 
incumbent LEC has already built; the entrant may just plug into it, at 
prices deemed fair by the FCC. 
Competition in long distance telephone markets developed by an 
arguably analogous process. 102 Outfits like MCI and (the forerunners of) 
Sprint built rather small operations that interconnected only two or 
three cities. They were then pennitted, however, to interconnect their 
system to AT&T's (over AT&T's objection). In this manner, MCI's St. 
Louis to Chicago line could become a St Louis to Chicago to the 
entire world line. From such bases, these new entrants acquired the 
customer base from which to build their own complete networks. 
96. ld. § 101(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(A). 
97. !d. § 101(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 2Sl(c)(S). 
98. Id. § lOl(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 2Sl(c)(6). 
99. Id. § lOl(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 2Sl(b)(2). 
100. Id. § lOl(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 2Sl(b)(3). 
101. Id. § 101(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 2Sl(b)(4). 
102. TLP, supra note 6, at 477-79 & 485-89. 
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Conceivably (hopefully, if you voted for the 1996 Act), local tele-
phony markets may prove accessible to just such incremental competi-
tive growth. Perhaps new carriers will build better networks inside the 
existing local loops or will disaggregate the existing structures and sell 
their components at lower prices. 
b. BOCs into Everything 
The 1996 Act adds to Title II of the 1934 Act a new Part III, 
called "Special Provisions Concerning Bell Operating Companies."103 
New section 271 pennits the BOCs to offer long distance telephone 
service. Section 273 allows the BOCs to manufacture telecommunica-
tions equipment (i.e., the wires and switches, and associated software, 
that make up the local loop) and customer premises equipment (i.e., the 
handsets and switchboards that connect individuals and offices to the 
local loop). All of these activities were forbidden by the MFJ. 104 
The consent decree also kept the BOCs out of "infonnation servic-
es,"105 a vague tenn that essentially embraced providing data that the 
phone company had assembled or acted upon. 106 That restriction was 
removed in subsequent court proceedings, 107 but a new section 274 now 
governs "electronic publishing" by the BOCs. The Act contains a laun-
dry list definition of electronic publishing, describing several types of 
data that are included in the tenn and others that are not. 108 Essentially, 
"electronic publishing" is the transmission by a phone company of 
infonnation that the company has generated or altered. The definition 
is, in other words, very close to that employed in the consent decree. 109 
As noted, the purpose of these provisions is to remove the absolute 
entry barriers that the MFJ's line of business restrictions imposed on 
103. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 151(a). 
104. lLP, supra note 6, at 505-07. 
105. /d. at 506. 
106. /d. at 550-53 (citing United States v. Western Elec. Co., 993 F2d 1572 (D.C. Clr. 
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S 984 (1993)). Nynex could not supply a stock quotation system for 
which it had assembled the data, but it could transmit a ticker service whose content was man-
aged by others. 
107. lLP, supra note 6, at 550-53. 
108. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 151(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 274(h). 
109. The 1996 Act also addresses two lines of business not expressly covered by the MFJ. 
New section 275 regulates a BOC provision of alarm monitoring services. New section 276 sets 
new ground rules for any Bell operating company that provides pay phone services. 
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the BOCs and to substitute a system of regulated entry to guard against 
potential predation or discrimination by the BOCs against their rivals 
who do not control local exchange facilities. What types of regulations 
are substituted? You name any and you'll find it here. Various provi-
sions dealing with various practices impose various regulations. For 
example, ne~ section 275 erects an absolute entry barrier; neither 
BOCs nor their affiliates may offer alarm monitoring services in the 
next five years.110 The same section also imposes a flat ban on granting 
rival alarm services inferior interconnection111 and on cross-subsidizing 
BOC alarm services from telephone exchange operations.112 
New section 274 forbids BOCs to offer electronic publishing except 
through a separate affiliated entity or a joint venture, 113 but this sepa-
rate-subsidiary requirement sunsets after four years. 114 New section 272 
also imposes a separate affiliate requirement on BOC manufacturing of 
equipment or provision of long distance services, m but imposes a dif-
ferent sunset rule!16 (Previously, the FCC had determined that the sepa-
rate subsidiary requirement was not a sound policy because it needless-
ly sacrificed economies of scale and scope, 117 but Congress determined 
otherwise in the new Act) 
Most dramatically, BOCs may not offer long distance services118 or 
manufacture telecommunications equipment119 until they have first been 
certified by the FCC. To be certified for these purposes, a BOC must 
demonstrate to the Commission that it meets the fourteen requirements 
specified in a "competitive checklist'' established by new section 
271 ( c )(2)(B).120 Most of these conditions relate to the interconnection 
obligations, detailed above, that other provisions of the Act impose on 
each incumbent LEC. For example, the BOC must show that it is pro-
viding or has offered to provide nondiscriminatory access to its poles, 121 
number portability, 122 and unbundled services.123 In short, the BOCs' 
110. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 275(a)(1). 
111. Id. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 275(b)(1). 
112. Id. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 275(b)(2). 
113. Id. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 274(b). 
114. Id. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 274(g)(2). 
115. Id. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 272(a)(2). 
116. /d. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 272(f)(1). 
117. 1LP, supra note 6, at 554-58 (citing California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990). 
118. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 271(b)(I). 
119. /d. § 15I(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 273(a). 
120. Id. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B). 
121. Id. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iii). 
122. /d. § 151(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xi). 
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ability to offer long distance services and to manufacture equipment is 
conditioned on their meeting their new open interconnection responsibil-
ities; in turn, if BOCs meet these responsibilities, true competition in 
the market(s) for local exchange services may become feasible. 
Further, before the FCC authorizes a BOC to offer long distance 
services, the agency must ask the Attorney General for an opinion. 124 
What, if any, weight the Commission must give to the Attorney 
General's opinion is not specified. A BOC that manufactures and sells 
equipment must also disclose vast quantities of information about its 
protocols, technical requirements, and network configuration. 125 The goal 
of these provisions is to prevent the BOC from using inside information 
gained in its role as a local exchange service to become the sole sup-
plier of equipment to operate that service. 
In sum, it is difficult to imagine a regulatory strategy, other than a 
permanent complete ban on entry into allied markets, 126 for coping with 
the possibility of predatory cross-subsidization and discriminatory inter-
connection by Bell operating companies that is not employed, at one 
point or another, in the 1996 Act. The new Act does abandon the 
MFJ's premise that the newly created BOCs should be strictly confined 
to offering regulated plain vanilla local exchange service. But the Act 
does not permit unrestricted entry into other markets or deny the MFJ's 
premise that the BOCs, if not regulated, will likely unfairly monopolize 
allied markets. Rather, the 1996 Act expresses a preference for seeking 
the benefits of competition in these markets, by letting the BOCs in, 
while strictly overseeing these carriers' behavior so that BOC entry 
does not perversely retard competition. (These provisions of the new 
Act apply only to those local exchange carriers that are former Bell 
companies.) 
c. Universal Service 
"Universal service" has been an articulated goal of telephone regu-
lation at least since the 1960's. 127 What it means, however, has never 
123. /d. § 15l{a), adding 41 U.S.C. 27l(c)(2)(B}(vi). 
124. /d. § 15l{a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 27l(d)(2)(A). 
125. /d. § l5l(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 273(c). 
126. Recall that this was the principal regulatory strategy employed in the consent decree. 
127. Mueller, supra note 17, at 355. 
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been clear, although the concept has always been tied, in some fashion, 
to the presence of internal cross-subsidies in the pricing of phone ser-
vice and has been limited to the subsidized pricing of basic voice-grade 
dial tone. 
For example, 128 to some, "universal service" means that a telephone 
line should be available to every U.S. residence at an average, roughly 
standardized, cost. Principally, this entails pricing basic phone service to 
outlying rural areas below the costs of that service. 129 To others, "uni-
versal service" means keeping the costs of basic dial tone service to 
residences as low as is feasible. Principally, that has entailed charging 
higher rates to businesses than to residences for equivalent phone ser-
vice. To yet others, "universal service" means charging lower rates to 
people with lower incomes. One method of pursuing this goal at the 
national level has been to price long-distance service substantially above 
its costs, so that residential rates could be subsidized by the override. 
(Lower income people make fewer long distance calls than higher in-
come people.) 
Until the 1996 Act was passed, no statutory codification of the 
principle of universal service existed. Now we have new Section 254 of 
old Title IT. 130 It requires the Commission to set up a federal-state joint 
board ("Joint Board") to implement the universal service goal.131 
What is "universal service" now? Well, it is everything. Certainly, 
it is no longer restricted to providing simple basic voice-grade dial tone 
to favored classes. One key provision states that the Joint Board and 
the Commission are to observe this principle: 
Consumers in all regions of the Nation, including low-income 
consumers and those in rural, insular, and high cost areas, 
should have access to telecommunications and information ser-
vices, including interexchange [i.e., long distance] services and 
advanced telecommunications and information services, that are 
reasonably comparable to those services provided in urban areas 
128. Most of the examples in this paragraph arc discussed in 11.P, Sllpra nole 6, nt 467-68. 
129. If the point is not intuitively obvious, suppose it costs S100 to string a aelephone line 
one mile. Such a line might service one million people in Chicago, but only len pi:Ople in the 
rural parts of Montana. If the latter arc to receive phone service nt the national average cost 
per home of stringing a wire to the home, then rural Montnna residents Y.ill pay less than the 
costs of stringing a wire to them. 
130. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § lOl(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 254. 
131. Id. § 101(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1). 
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and that are available at rates that are reasonably comparable to 
rates charged for similar services in urban areas. 132 
Nothing seems to be left out of this list. Universal service encompasses 
below cost treatment on the basis of income, geography, and quality of 
service. Nor is the subsidy limited to basic voice-grade dial tone ser-
vice. 
But wait; there's more. Another key provision states that 
"[u]niversal service is an evolving level of telecommunications services 
that the Commission shall establish periodically . . . taking into account 
advances in telecommunications and information technologies and ser-
vices. . . . " 133 Further, universal service includes the principle that 
"[e]lementary and secondary schools and classrooms, health care provid-
ers, and libraries should have access to advanced telecommunications 
services .... "134 Both the "universal" and the "service" aspects of 
"universal service" will grow over time. 
How will these universal service goals be achieved? By giving 
universal service support, for specific universal service purposes, to 
telecommunications carriers. 135 Whence the money? The Commission 
and the Joint Board will place a tax136 on telephone operators. "All 
providers of telecommunications services should make an equitable and 
nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and advancement of 
universal service."137 In particular, "[e]very telecommunications carrier 
that provides interstate telecommunications services shall contribute, on 
an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis . . . :ms 
Universal service is now an explicitly articulated goal of telecom-
munications regulation. It is to be achieved by levying a proportionate 
tax on all telecommunications service providers, which should make 
more visible both the nature and amounts of the cross-subsidies encom-
passed within the universal service program. Several classes of custom-
132. Id § 101(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(3). 
133. Id § 101(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 254(c)(1). 
134. Id § 101(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(6). 
135. Jd § 101(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 254(e). 
136. I beg every Representative and Senator who voted for this bill, and the President who 
signed it, to forgive me for calling this thing by its correct name. The new Act, of course, 
does not employ the "T word." 
137. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 101(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(4). 
138. Id § 101(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 254(d). 
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ers are to be protected by the universal service policy. Exactly what 
services will be encompassed within the concept of universal service re-
mains quite unclear, however, because no specific or fixed meaning 
may be ascribed to the list of items that make up "universal service"; it 
is an "evolving level" of services to be established "periodically' by 
the FCC, 139 not just a basic dial tone. 
B. Content Controls 
Government cannot effectively control the content of the electronic 
mass media in this country.140 When it tries to do so, it inevitably acts 
to advantage privileged speech and to penalize that which is unpopular 
and out of fashion. 141 At times, the FCC has appeared to grasp the 
truth of these virtually self-evident propositions.142 But neither the Sen-
ate nor the House has ever been able to resist for long the temptation 
to try to make radio and television "better"143 and the Supreme Court 
seems to delight in cheering on their efforts to do so. 144 
In the 1960's the hot button topics were media access and drug use 
among the cultured elite (i.e., children of Senators, Representatives, and 
Commissioners). So we got the fairness doctrine, cable access channels 
and bans on playing songs that "promoted" or "glorified" drug use.145 
Today, the hot button issues are the virulent corruption of young 
people's morals by the sounds of profanity and the sight of human 
genitals and the brutalizing, dehumanization of our youth by permitting 
them to watch simulated violence. 
So, Congress added to the 1996 Act a variety of censorship regula-
tions designed to turn the Internet into a souped-up version of lvfy 
Weekly Reader and to return broadcast and cable television to the glory 
years of Amos 'n' Andy. These new regulations are embedded in Title 
V of the new Act, which is called the "Communications Decency Act 
139. /d. § 101(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 254(c)(l). 
140. RBP, supra note 6, passim. 
141. /d. a1 chs. 4, S & 9. 
142. See, e.g., TI.P, supra note 6, al 149-52 & 188-94. 
143. Consider, for example, Congress' repeated efforts to legislate on "indecent" bro::!dcasting. 
described id. a1 176-78. 
144. RBP, supra note 6, a1 175-202. 
145. See generally id. al chs. 4 & 5. 
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of 1996" ("CDA"). 146 
1. Internet 
The key provision here is section 502 of the new Act, 147 entitled 
"Obscene or Harassing use of Telecommunications Facilities Under the 
Communications Act of 1934," which is reprinted at the end of this 
article. The section is, to say the least, somewhat opaque. People are 
already arguing about its meaning and these arguments will persist 
through at least several court challenges. 148 The central part of section 
502 makes it a crime to: 
useD an interactive computer service to send to a specific per-
son or persons under 18 years of age; or [to] useD any inter-
active computer service to display in a manner available to a 
person under 18 years of age, any comment . . . image, or 
other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in 
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary commu-
nity standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regard-
less of whether the user of such service placed the call or initi-
ated the communication. 149 
Literally, these provisions would appear to criminalize transmission 
over the Internet (or any other pathway to a personal computer accessi-
ble to anyone under 18)150 of countless novels, poems, photographs or 
motion pictures. Adults appear to be required to converse, through their 
interactive computers, in language fit for nine-year-olds. 
But with a statute like this, literalness may not get us very far. 
After all, the Communications Decency Act literally distinguishes be-
tween "an interactive computer service" and "any interactive computer 
service."ISI The Act also provides some defenses that suggest that the 
146. Telecommunications Act of 1996 §§ 501-561. 
147. /d. § 502, amending and adding to 41 U.S.C. § 233. 
148. As this article was written, a three-judge federal district court held the Act unconstitu-
tionally vague and an impennissible intrusion into the First Amendment rights of adults. See 
ACLU v. Reno, Nos. CIV.A.96-963, 96-1458, 1996 U.S. Dist LEXIS 7919, at •86 (E.D. Pa. 
June 12, 1996). The Justice Department has filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. See 
also Randall Mikkelsen, Internet Indecency Ruling Appealed to U.S. Supreme Court, REuTERS 
N.AM. WIRE, July 2, 1996; Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 561(b). 
149. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 502(2), adding 41 U.S.C. §§ 223(d)(1)(A)&(B). 
150. Anywhere in the world? 
151. Compare Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 502(2), adding 41 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(A) 
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merely passive act of transmitting what someone else has posted does 
not violate the Act. 152 Further, the Act is quite silent - perhaps delib-
erately so- with respect to the kind of intent (or, mens rea) necessary 
to make the behavior criminal. Must a message transmitter intend that a 
specific underage person receive the communication? Nor does the Act 
address the question of what knowledge (or, scienter) the sender must 
have. Presumably, the sender must be aware of the contents of the 
message;153 must slhe also be aware that the message is "patently offen-
sive"? And whose "community standards" provide the guideposts for 
this inquiry into offensiveness? Nor does the Act address the issue of 
extraterritoriality: does Congress mean to punish someone sitting in 
Estonia who posts a picture of a naked person on his home computer 
bulletin board that could be accessed by an enterprising U.S. teenag-
er?Is4 
All these questions ask, in part, what Congress meant. To the ex-
tent that anyone can talk about the "intention" of a corporate body, we 
can say only that Congress meant to get (many or most) discussions or 
pictures of sexual activities or organs off the Internet. To the ex1ent 
that we have any memory of censorship efforts in this country, we 
know that this is a futile task, doomed to failure - but, perhaps a few 
pitiable folks will be sent to prison in the effort.155 
Somewhat more helpfully, the Communications Decency Act also 
contains section 509, entitled "Online Family Empowennent."156 This 
adds a new section 230 to Title II of the 1934 Act, which is to be 
entitled "Protection for Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive 
Material."157 The new section essentially immunizes from liability any 
"provider or user of an interactive computer service" who restricts "ac-
cess to or [the] availability of' indecent material or helps others gain 
with § 502(2), adding 41 U.S.C. § 223(d)(l)(B). 
152. Id. § 502(2), adding 41 U.S.C. § 223(e)(1). 
153. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 156 (1959). 
154. The editors of this journal infonn me that this ruticle may be made available. in elec-
tronic form, to computer tenninals here and abroad. Accordingly, I wish to say for the record 
that I assume that anyone reading this article - at least in electronic fonn - is, in fact, fully 
clothed while doing so. It is certainly not my intention to suggest, much less to inciie. coed 
naked law review reading. 
155. It is, I think, no accident that it was Blutarsky, the Quasimodo of "Animal House." who 
responded to the classic battle cry, "This situation absolutely requires n renlly futile and stupid 
gesture be done on somebody's part!," with the immortal cluuge. "We're just the guys to do 
it!" who was subsequently elected to the U.S. Senlltc. 
156. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 509, adding 41 U.S.C. § 230. 
157. /d. § 509, adding 41 u.s.c. § 230. 
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the technical means to do so. 158 Without such a provision, a person or 
firm operating as a common carrier might have been liable for failure 
to transmit "indecent" material. As an ordinary rule, common carriers 
are not expected or permitted to censor the contents of communications 
they carry. 159 Because this section apparently simply facilitates the cre-
ation of "indecency-free safe harbors" for those who desire them, this 
may be regarded as a helpful measure that may affirmatively assist 
people in the exercise of their constitutional rights to choose what they 
read, see or hear.160 
2. Cable 
The Communications Decency Act contains a few measures de-
signed to reduce the amount of nudity on cable television. Section 505 
of the new Act tells cable operators that they must scramble the signal 
of "any channel of its service primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented 
programming."161 Section 506 tells operators that they can refuse to 
transmit any public access or leased access program ''which contains 
obscenity, indecency or nudity."162 Most interesting in this regard is 
Section 504: "Upon request by a cable service subscriber, a cable oper-
ator shall, without charge, fully scramble or otherwise fully block the 
audio and video programming of each channel carrying such program-
ming so that one not a subscriber does not receive it."163 No definition 
of "such programming" is provided, nor is any reference back apparent. 
Can this mean that any single subscriber can force an operator to 
scramble the signal for any channel, without regard to whether the 
158. /d. § 509, adding 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2). 
159. See Michael I. Myerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Ca"iers: Identifying the 
"Speaker" Within the New Media, 71 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 79, 114-15, 121-22 (1995). 
160. For a good description of the boundaries of this protected right, see Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971). 
161. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 641(a). 
162. /d. § 506, amending 47 U.S.C. § 531(e) and§ 532(c)(2). The extension to non-indecent 
nudity is interesting, but what this is supposed to mean escapes me entirely. To "contain[ ) 
nudity" must the program depict a completely nude person, portrayed as such from all sides 
and angles? If not, may the operator censor a program that depicts a baby being diapered? Or 
a teen-age girl not wearing shoes? One might say that "nudity" in this context must mean 
"erotic nudity." But, of course, there are pedophiles out there. And some people do have foot 
fetishes. In any event, we are talking here about nudity that is neither obscene nor indecent, 
according to the statutory text 
163. /d. § 504, adding 47 U.S.C. § 640(a). 
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channel carries sex or violence? 
Note that Congress structured each of these sections so as not to 
engage in strict censorship. Operators are only told to scramble certain 
channels or pennitted to decline to cany certain programs. The first 
tactic nevertheless risks invalidation because of its selectivity. Why are 
only sexually-oriented programs to be scrambled? The second tactic will 
test the bounds of the Supreme Court's recent decision invalidating a 
statute that required cable operators to segregate indecent programs on 
certain channels.164 
3. The V-chip 
Section 551 of the new Act is entitled "Parental Choice in Televi-
sion Programming."165 The section contains Congressional findings that 
children are harmed by exposure to violent video programming166 and 
to pervasive and casual treatment of sexual material.167 Further, "[t]here 
is a compelling governmental interest in empowering parents to limit 
the negative influences of video programming that is harmful to chil-
dren."168 Based on these findings, section 551 attempts to facilitate 
private, parental screening and blocking of sexual or violent program-
ming. 
Accordingly, the Act directs the Commission to establish ways to 
identify and rate ''video programming that contains sexual, violent, or 
other indecent material about which parents should be infonned before 
it is displayed to children."169 To devise this ratings system, the FCC is 
to employ an advisory committee.170 These provisions, however, do not 
become effective for one year.171 Indeed, they do not become effective 
164. See Denver Area Educ. Telecoms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, Nos. 95-124, 95-227, 1996 
U.S. LEXIS 4261 (June 28, 1996). 
165. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 551, adding 41 U.S.C. § 303. 
166. Jd. § 5S1(a)(4), adding 41 U.S.C. § 303(a)(4). 
167. Jd. § SS1(a)(6), adding 41 U.S.C. § 303(a)(6). 
168. Jd. § 5S1(a)(8), adding 41 U.S.C. § 303(a)(8). 
169. Id. § 551(b)(1), adding 41 U.S.C. § 303(w)(1). Civil libenarinns v.-atch out! The notion 
that "indecency" encompasses more than "sexual" program mtlterial (unless meant only as a 
more polite way of incorporating depictions of excretion) is quite new to the law. What is this 
"other indecent material" that is neither violent nor sexual in nature, content or theme? See 
also note 162. 
170. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 5S1(b)(1 & 2), adding 41 U.S.C. § 303(b)(2). 
171. /d. § 5S1(e)(1), adding 41 U.S.C. § 303(a)(1). 
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at all if the distributors of video programming have "established volun-
tary [rating] rules"172 and "agreed voluntarily to broadcast signals that 
contain ratings of such programming."173 
In short, through section 551, Congress calls on the industry to 
adopt a uniform rating code. That "request" is backed up by the direc-
tion to the Commission to do the job itself if the industry fails to do 
it. Not surprisingly, the television industry fears the outcome of an 
FCC-initiated process. Shortly after passage of the new Act, an industry 
committee was formed which is expected to devise and implement a 
ratings system. 174 
What will be done with these ratings? First, as noted, they will be 
embedded in the signal broadcasters (and cablecasters) transmit. Then 
they can be scanned by television sets. The Act also directs the Com-
mission to regulate television set manufacture so that in the future tele-
vision sets are "equipped with a feature designed to enable viewers to 
block display of all programs with a common rating."175 In short, the 
ratings code will be inserted into broadcast signals, where it will be 
"read" by a feature added to the decoder on these new television sets. 
If the new feature (in political parlance, a "V -chip"176) is activated by 
the set owner, the feature will block reception of encoded signals. 177 
C. Overview 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is to a large extent a grab-
bag, a pastiche of provisions aimed at a variety of real or imagined 
ills. One might say that the only thing all these provisions have in 
common is that they reform the law the FCC applies. 
That would be too simple, of course. Recall that at the outset, I 
suggested the Act might also be characterized principally as a legisla-
172. !d. § 551(e)(1)(A), adding 47 U.S.C. § 303(e)(1)(A). 
173. Id § 551(e)(1)(B), adding 47 U.S.C. § 303(e)(1)(B). 
174. See generally Media Notes: TV Ratings Group Formed, MEDIA DAILY, Mar. 14, 1996, 
at no. 5, vol. 4, available in LEXIS, Newsletter Database. See also Paul Farhi, TV Execs De-
liver Rating Plan to White House, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1996, at Dl. 
175. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 551(c), adding 47 U.S.C. 303(x). 
176. The "V" is for "violence." 
177. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 204(b), adding 47 U.S.C. 308(d} also requires all 
television licensees to keep and make public all complaints they receive concerning violent 
programming on their stations. 
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tive response to the twin features of technological convergence and 
legal balkanization. Also, the censorship features of the Act, while 
interesting and important, are by no means its dominant features. 
Because the Act deals with so many diverse subjects, an evaluation 
of it must be also somewhat piecemeal. Nevertheless, I attempt some 
interconnected criticisms in what follows. 
ill. EVALUATION 
What are we to make of this complicated new Act? In part, one's 
judgment will be influenced by which provisions one cares about. To 
take an easy example, the owner of a radio station will find almost 
nothing to dislike in this Act, while the removal of group ownership 
caps is quite likely to increase the station's value. Count the AMIFM 
radio licensees as supporters. 
More critically, one's judgment depends on the values one brings to 
evaluation of telecommunications regulation generally. For an obvious 
example, consider a person who is comfortable with the post-World 
War ll British model, in which the government owns and operates all 
the facilities of telecommunications and programs its airwaves. I suspect 
this person would find little to applaud in the interconnection provisions 
of the new Act but would presumably not be fazed by the regulation of 
"indecent'' telecommunications. 
Personally, I do not like the old British model. It does not comport 
at all with our notions of freedom of speech and our reliance on mar-
ket mechanisms to appraise and allocate goods and resources. By what 
criteria do I suggest we ought to judge regulation of the electronic 
media? Writing at the time only about broadcast regulation, 178 Lucas 
Powe and I spelled out criteria that we would employ and which I am 
satisfied would make admirable baselines for all mass media regulation. 
(Indeed, we argued that a very compelling reason for adopting our cri-
teria was that, in this country, citizens and scholars of virtually all 
political persuasions adhere steadfastly to these standards when judging 
the regulation of non-electronic mass media.) 
In brie/,119 we advance four criteria for measuring whether telecom-
178. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Lucas A. Powc:, Jr., Com-erging rust Amendment Prin-
ciples for Converging Communications Media, 104 YALE W. 1719, 1726-32 (1995). 
179. See id. (for details of the arguments set out in this parograph). 
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munications regulation serves truly public (not private) interest goals: 
(1) Editorial control over what is said and how it is said should be 
lodged in private, not governmental, institutions. (2) Government has an 
important role to play in fostering access by speakers to mass media. 
For purposes of this criterion, "access" means the ability to reach any 
willing recipient by any speaker willing to pay the economic costs180 of 
doing so (and does not mean that government must or should require 
others to subsidize the would-be communicator). (3) Government poli-
cies should foster diversity in the media marketplace. Diversity is 
achieved when people are allowed to bid for any information or enter-
tainment they desire and to receive what they seek, so long as they are 
willing to pay the economic costs of receiving it. (4) Government may 
not sacrifice any of the three foregoing principles to further goals asso-
ciated with either or both of the others. Where such sacrifice is not en-
tailed, however, government may extend the goals associated with any 
of these principles. Put somewhat less formally, these criteria suggest 
that we should evaluate government regulation of any medium of mass 
communications by whether it avoids content controls, reduces entry 
barriers, prevents anticompetitive behavior, and facilitates technological 
progress. 
Using those criteria, I judge the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
to be a mixed blessing. It seems to me that some of its features are 
good, others bad, and some plain ugly. 181 
A. The Good 
1. Broadcasting 
It seems to me that, by the criteria I urge, three aspects of the new 
rules regarding broadcasting, both radio and television, are indisputably 
"good." First, the removal or loosening of limits on the number of 
stations group owners may control should increase competition. Effi-
cient firms should now be freer to purchase inefficient ones. Costs of 
I 80. By "economic costs," I mean the costs (including opportunity costs) of resources em· 
ployed in communicating, not necessarily the prices charged by (perhaps monopolistic) owners 
of those resources. 
181. The attempted invocation here of the motion picture "The Good, the Bad and the Ugly" 
is deliberate. I find that movie complicated, dull, boring, and unintelligible. So would any Eng· 
!ish speaking person, not trained in telecommunications law or practice, who reads the new Act 
Accordingly, I think it is quite fair to ask (as did one of my students) of those of us who do 
find the new Act interesting (and somewhat readable) whether we need to "get a life." 
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access should go down. 
I would not rate this as a very large plus. After all, station buyers 
other than existing group owners have always been available to pur-
chase less efficient stations. Nor does there seem to be a shortage of 
managerial talent in the industry that would suggest that only group 
own_ers are efficient acquirors. Nevertheless, removing this artificial 
barrier to the market for trading in station licenses ought to make the 
broadcast industry more efficient 
The second and third "good" provisions operate in tandem. By both 
extending the broadcast station license term and ending the comparative 
renewal proceeding, the Act should greatly lower the regulatory costs 
of doing business as a broadcaster. Those lower costs ought to translate 
into more stations on the air, operating at (and therefore providing 
access at) lower rates. 
Further, now that radio licenses are essentially perpetual, licensees 
should also be able to make, at lower cost, better long-term investments 
in programming and talent. Until these revisions, broadcasters had to 
rely on the FCC and reviewing courts agreeing that they were entitled 
to a "renewal expectancy" to justify renewing their licenses.182 Now, 
station owners can show lenders and investors that, so long as they 
abide by the rules, they have a statutory right to a renewal (and for a 
longer term). 
2. Cable 
Two features of the Act regarding cable seem to me probably good. 
a. Partial Repeal of Rate Regulation183 
I applaud the removal of rate regulation from the "cable tier." This 
is because I think that the principal effect of cable rate regulation to 
date has been to degrade the cable plant Let me say immediately that I 
do not know how to prove or disprove that assertion. Now, let me 
explain why I believe it nevertheless. 
When the Commission imposed rate regulation (at Congress's direc-
182. See 1LP, supra note 6, at lOS-IS. 
183. The data provided in this discussion is taken from ld. at 442-60. 
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tive ), it chose not to employ traditional rate of return regulation, in 
which the agency monitors all costs and chooses an acceptable addition-
al rate of return. Today, most observers agree that such regulation is 
more costly than any good it produces. Rather, the Commission chose 
to impose "price caps" on cable systems. Under this method, the FCC 
sets a limit on ("caps") the regulated (cable) firm's prices. The firm is 
then free to lower prices as much as it wishes. 
A principal asserted advantage of the price caps approach is that 
this method gives price regulated firms an incentive to become more 
efficient, an incentive denied them by rate of return regulation, which 
(in theory) would lower permissible prices as soon as costs were low-
ered. It is true that price caps increase the incentive to be more effi-
cient. That is because they increase the incentive to cut costs. Another 
way to cut costs is to let the system go to seed. Price caps also make 
it next to impossible to increase costs in order to increase quality of 
service. 
Thus, the imposition of price caps on cable systems rendered them 
almost powerless to increase consumer satisfaction by offering subscrib-
ers better quality, albeit at higher cost.184 So, it appears, the nation's 
cable plant has just sat there, gathering moss, since the imposition of 
price caps. To keep profits up, cable systems had the further option 
actually to let their systems begin to rot. Whether they did, or will, do 
this only time will tell. 
This begrudging partial removal, in three years, of some cable rate 
regulation ought to offer some possibility for new investment in the 
cable infrastructure. Meanwhile, competition from even more recent 
technologies, like direct broadcast satellites, video rentals, and other 
local entertainment sources, ought to constrain the prices for the "cable 
network" tier. 
b. Dropping the Telco Ban 
The repeal of the prohibition on telephone companies (telcos) offer-
184. Belatedly, the FCC realized this problem and began to offer "upgrade incentives." These 
permitted cable operators to add channels and recover their costs so long as prices were kept 
down on existing channels. This provided little aid, of course, to systems that might wish to 
upgrade by offering better physical connections. And it essentially simply substituted rate of 
return regulation, a method whose ineffectiveness had supposedly led to the preference for price 
caps! 
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ing cable services is also commendable, at least in theory. The FCC's 
''video dial tone" rules already pennitted telcos to offer a pure common 
carrier cable service in their telephone service area, 185 but the new Act 
pennits greater vertical integration of programming and pipeline in a 
telco cable system. This may enable the telcos to diversify their risk 
and, thus, to invest more; it certainly offers them the opportunity to 
create a cable system '~ust like that'' already offered by competing 
cable firms. If providing cable television service is to become a com-
petitive market, this may occur in many ways, but surely one of the 
most likely is by the entry, in many local markets, of the local phone 
company. 
3. Telephony 
On balance, I think it was the better part of wisdom to unleash the 
Baby Bells, pennitting them to enter long distance and manufacturing 
markets, and to open up the local exchange carriers to interconnection 
and access so that competitive LECs might arise. Certainly, these ap-
proaches follow the path we usually prefer of pursuing the goals of 
access and diversity by fostering open competitive markets. 
One should not let this point pass, however, without noticing that 
there is another side. Phrased as a smorgasbord of acronyms, perhaps 
the LECs and BOCs should have been confined to POTS ("plain old 
telephone service"). In longer and plainer tenns, maybe it would be 
better to pennit monopoly firms (or monopoly government agencies) to 
superintend the infrastructure, while others (excluding the monopoly 
firms) operate services provided through and upon that infrastructure. 
This is somewhat analogous to the way we run the highway transporta-
tion system. Government builds and operates the roads (infrastructure) 
but leaves the provision of transportation services (cars, buses, trucks 
on the highways) to the private sector. 
Perhaps, due to economies of scale and scope, it is cheaper to have 
just one telecommunications wire going into each and every home. If 
so, it might be wise to let one firm build and operate those wires (and 
their attendant switches and interconnection points) without being able 
to sell services to businesses and consumers (i.e., without having the 
ability to prey in allied markets). Indeed, one might say that such a 
185. TLP, supra note 6, at 567-87. 
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policy - which we might describe by the slogan "Let the BOCs do 
POTS" - was the central feature of the consent decree that dissolved 
AT&T and created these BOCs. 186 
I reject this wishful thinking because I believe it is insufficiently 
sensitive to the dynamism of telecommunications technologies. How 
could we define "POTS" today in a manner that we thought would be 
intelligible ten years from now? Would these infrastructure providers 
also have to provide the mobile telephone services that are growing 
today? Would we include airplane-to-ground telephones in the LECs' 
protected zone? Is "call waiting" or "call forwarding" plain old tele-
phone service or an enhanced service? 
In 1956 AT&T signed an antitrust consent decree in which it 
agreed to confine its services to regulated telecommunications offer-
ings. 187 Two decades later, everyone was squabbling over whether this 
meant AT&T could operate and sell services for interactive comput-
ers. 188 I think an attempt to impose a legal straitjacket on the local 
exchange carriers would fail similarly. 
In short, given the constantly evolving technologies of mass tele-
phonic communication, I believe we will just have to live with com-
petition in this area, like it or not. How to induce and oversee that 
competition is discussed below. 
4. Summary 
Particularly in light of the more negative commentary that follows, 
I should say that what is good about the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 is quite good indeed. It seeks to end monopolization and 
balkanization, especially of cable and wired telephone markets, by 
breaking down entry barriers. Whether, to what extent, and in what 
form telecommunications technologies will converge ought to be decid-
ed, then, by the free interactions of producers and consumers in mar-
ketplaces rather than by five FCC commissioners construing a sixty-
year-old statute. Put in terms of the criteria set forth above, access and 
diversity should increase, while the increasingly evident powers that 
consumers exercise over the media should reduce public pressures for 
censorship. 
186. /d. at 491-514. 
187. /d. at 480. 
188. /d. at 479-81. 
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B. The Bad 
In my view, most of the main features of the new Act contain 
"bad" features along with the "good." Candidly, one might describe 
these not as "bad" features of the Act, but as reasons not to be too 
optimistic about the good parts. I, however, call these "bad" parts of 
the Act because of the foregone opportunities to achieve real reform 
that they represent. 
1. Broadcasting 
The new Act does very little to reform broadcasting law and policy 
in helpful ways. Censorship is not repealed, but rather is extended. The 
horrors of spectrum allocation for television are not ameliorated, but 
compounded.189 The extended license terms and abolition of the com-
parative renewal hearing will have modest practical consequences be-
cause, in practice, licensees who do not flout the FCC or its rules al-
ways get their licenses renewed. 190 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was supposed to pull together 
the major needs and ideas for reform in this area of the law. With 
respect to broadcasting, however, the Act is just a series of missed 
opportunities. Congress gave the broadcasters some money by increas-
ing the value of their licenses. Viewers and listeners may perhaps bene-
fit from a slightly more competitive and slightly less costly system. 
Those of us who do not own stations could have done a lot better had 
Congress seriously considered reform, in the public interest, of broad-
casting law and policy. I discuss in subsequent sections of this Article 
what I believe some of those reforms would entail. 
2. Cable 
Here, too, I believe Congress labored mightily and brought forth a 
mouse. There is, I think, some - but not much - reason to believe 
that cable can be provided competitively. Probably, it is a natural mo-
nopoly.191 So consumers are unlikely to be able to protect themselves 
by switching to another cable company in their neighborhood. This 
means that, at least in the long run, subscribers are most likely to seek, 
189. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 §§ 201-207. 
190. lLP, supra note 6, at 105-20. 
191. For a discussion of the concept of a "natural monopoly" and its application to cable TV 
and to providing telephone service see id. at 331-32. 
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and perhaps obtain, protection from the monopoly ills of cable in three 
other ways. 
First, and most importantly, cable is likely to encounter direct com-
petition from other multi-video program distributors ("MVPDs'') using 
other technologies, such as direct broadcast satellites and multichannel 
multipoint distribution service ("MMDS"), to which cable subscribers 
can easily switch. Second, to the extent that cable remains a natural 
monopoly, cable service providers are likely to want to discriminate in 
the prices they charge, for example by offering cheap alternatives to the 
poor and more expensive ones to the wealthy. Such discrimination 
would still leave monopolist cable services with unjustifiably high in-
comes, but would also at least expand options available to all while 
providing some protection for low income consumers. Finally, modest 
leased access provisions - say, a requirement that five to ten percent 
of channel capacity be set aside for programmers' access to cable sys-
tems on a common carrier basis - is likely to protect against the 
chance that a cable monopolist would cause real harm to viewers' wel-
fare by selecting programs on the basis of ideological bias or by engag-
ing in gross price discrimination. 
If these arguments are correct, then letting telcos into cable will be, 
in the long run, of little consequence. 192 It would be more important, 
by far, to focus on establishing other MVPDs as viable competitors and 
strengthening and clarifying leased access rules. Further, the merely 
partial relaxation of rate regulation, to occur three years hence, does 
not seriously address the issue whether cable systems ought to be freed 
to compete, with other MVPDs and with other sources of information 
and entertainment, on the basis of quality of service offered. 
3. Telephony 
a. Everyone into LECs 
What I have just said about the natural monopoly aspects of cable 
television193 applies equally to the attempts to spur facilities-based com-
petition in the local loop. It is most likely that running a telecommuni-
192. However, if lelephone companies can operale cable syslems more cheaply than conven-
tional cable operators, then consumers will receive a long lerm benefit from lelco entry that 
could be quile substantial. 
193. See supra lext accompanying noles 191-92; see also supra nole 6 at 331. 
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cations wire to the home is a natural monopoly and so one ought to 
concentrate on regulating that monopoly or mitigating its ill effects. 
To some extent, the new Act accomplishes this. By placing e,..1en-
sive interconnection requirements on incumbent LECs, the 1996 Act 
creates a new vision of competition at the local loop level. In this 
vision, one firm may superintend the wires and switches that make up 
the local loop while that firm competes with others to sell exchange 
services, including the basic dial tone, to customers. 
The difficulty, I believe, with this aspect of the Act is not its vi-
sion, but its execution. The interconnection sections impose so many 
restrictions, and direct the Commission to write so many rules, 194 that 
one must fear that the regulatory costs of this open access regime will 
exceed its payoff in reduced rates or improved service quality. 
At the same time, the new Act does little to expand the competitive 
opportunities of the most likely competitors to incumbent LECs, the 
wireless phone (and other) services providers. Mobile, cellular telephony 
is now a rather mature technology employed by a large industry. ''Per-
sonal communications services" (''PCS") - which utilize even smaller 
devices that can carry even more data - are squarely on the horizon. 
The 1996 Act misses opportunities to make wireless a more robust 
competitor. LECs are still permitted to own wireless phone operations 
in their service area. The Act does not clearly grant wireless phone 
providers a federally protected right to interconnection with LECs at 
real economic costs.195 The rules for auctioning off the spectrum that 
PCS uses are still loaded with special rules for special groups196 so that 
the spectrum is less likely to be used efficiently, while the auctions 
provide modest "welfare" benefits to small businesses. 
Two cheers, then, for the local loop interconnection aspects of the 
1996 Act. One can hope that a subsequent Congress will return to this 
important topic and strip many of the interconnection regulations away 
while acting further to foster wireless as a competitive alternative. 
194. See, e.g., In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, 1996 FCC LEXIS 2063 (Apr. 19, 1996). 
195. Some states have read § 252, added to the new Act, to commit this issue to the state 
regulatory commissions. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 101(a), adding 41 U.S.C. § 
252. I disagree with this view. I wish to note further that I have expressed this view, nt the 
behest of a private client, to responsible persons at the FCC. 
196. See Jon Van, High-Tech Bel: Cellular's Success Makes New Technology Seem a Surer 
Thing, em. TRIB., Dec. 5, 1994, at 1, zone C. 
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b. BOCs into Everything 
In a preceding section, I explained why I believe it is unwise and 
infeasible to try to impose line of business restrictions on local ex-
change carriers. With respect to those LECs that are not Bell operating 
companies, we have had no such restrictions for some time now. None 
of these LECs appears to have monopolized long distance or alarm 
services markets. Consequently, I believe one must applaud those fea-
tures of the new bill that admit the BOCs into the long distance servic-
es, equipment manufacturing, electronic publishing, and alarm monitor-
ing services markets. 
But there is a "bad" side to this "good" reform as well. Recall the 
numerous regulations with which the new Act surrounds any BOC 
wishing to enter these markets. 197 To enter the long distance market, for 
example, a BOC must not only employ a separate subsidiary, 198 but it 
must also show that it is now confronting (or has done all it can to 
bring about) facilities based competition in its local loop services. 199 At 
the same time, because the theory underlying the MFJ has now become 
part of the standard wisdom of antitrust law, the BOC remains con-
strained by the Sherman Act from engaging in discriminatory intercon-
nection or predatory cross subsidization.200 Meanwhile, the imposition of 
price caps instead of rate of return regulation makes a predatory cross 
subsidy strategy impractical in any event.201 
And what is the point of these countless regulations? To keep the 
BOC from preying against AT&T! The theory of the MFJ is now be-
ing used to protect AT&T. Is this because we need to protect AT&T 
from a new monolithic monster? No, these redundant provisions shelter 
AT&T from seven distinct, uncoordinated firms who will presumably 
have to compete against each other in the long distance market, as well 
as against AT&T, Sprint, MCI, and others. 
Simply put, the case for this kind of extensive, overlapping regula-
tion has not been made and probably cannot be made. A BOC is not 
AT&T. BOC entry into long distance or equipment manufacturing arm 
does not threaten AT&T in the same way that AT&T's long distance 
197. See supra text accompanying notes 103-26. 
198. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 151(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 272(a)(2)(B). 
199. /d. § 151(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(A). 
200. TLP, supra note 6, at 491-526. 
20 I. /d. at 532-41. 
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operations threatened MCI or its equipment manufacturing threatened 
Rolm. A BOC that wants to enter long distance or equipment manufac-
turing must face not only AT&T and its rivals, but other BOCs as 
well, while its prices are capped and it operates in an antitrust climate 
that now clearly sanctions the strategic anticompetitive behavior the 
BOC might find profitable.2°2 If the BOCs are to be let in, I believe 
they should be let in like everyone else. 
C. The Ugly 
The "good" features of the new Act, then, are clouded somewhat 
by "bad" features that prevent this legislation from being as good as it 
could be. Perhaps more significantly, the new Act contains several 
"ugly'' features, each of which perpetuates and to some ex1ent magni-
fies some fundamentally flawed aspects of telecommunications law and 
regulation. 
Oversimplifying, we employ two methods to discipline privately 
operated telecommunications firms so that they will serve the public 
interest. One method is subjecting them to the oversight of an indepen-
dent regulatory agency, the FCC. The other is subjecting these firms to 
the rigors of marketplace competition, the oversight of consumers. The 
new Act purports to shift the balance between these two methods de-
cidedly in favor of reliance on consumer-driven market forces as disci-
plining agents. At the same time, however, the statute does nothing to 
correct some very deep flaws in our policy of regulating telecommuni-
cations by competition. 
1. The Problem of Spectrum Allocation 
"The spectrum" is not tangible; it is nothing that someone can 
possess. Rather what we call ''the spectrum" is a list of frequencies on 
which we currently know how to transmit data through electronic sinu-
soidal waves.203 Like the chemist's Table of Periodic Elements, the 
electrical engineer's spectrum has been a constantly growing list as 
202. Of course, these arguments arc not convincing if the BOCs arc going to be pennitted to 
merge among themselves to the point where only one or two or them remain. 
203. /d. at 29-35. 
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technology has evolved to pennit effective data transmission at higher 
and lower ends of the spectrum. 
The ability to transmit encoded data electronically on a particular 
frequency, free from (a substantial amount of) interference, is a valu-
able resource.204 I will call this resource "spectrum use." Spectrum use 
is a resource in precisely the same way that transmitters, electrical 
energy, microphones, and cameras are resources. Each of these goods, 
when assembled in various combinations with other goods, pennits an 
operator to create value, to perfonn a service for which people are 
willing to pay. 
Spectrum use differs from these other resources, however, in one 
key respect. It is the sole resource used in telecommunications indus-
tries that has historically been given away without an explicit charge 
for it. Broadcasters buy microphones, transmitters, electrical energy, and 
so forth, but they are "given"205 spectrum use. 
This government "gift policy" creates a huge competitive imbalance 
between those who would transmit through the air and those who 
would do so by wire. Congress has recognized this problem and ame-
liorated it a bit, in other legislation, by pennitting or requiring the FCC 
to auction off spectrum for non-broadcast uses in the future.206 Per-
versely, however, the newer 1996 Act seems oblivious to the problem. 
For example, the true emerging competitors to cable appear to be 
direct broadcast satellites ("DBS") and multichannel multipoint distribu-
tion service ("MMDS"). Yet most finns in these markets were given 
free spectrum use while cable had to purchase its wire access. The true 
emerging competitors for the local exchange carriers appear to be the 
mobile, cellular industry. But this industry was given its spectrum in 
large markets and acquired it via lottery in smaller ones. 207 The new 
Act virtually directs the Commission to give free spectrum use to tele-
vision broadcasters so that they may develop high definition television 
("HDTV"). Why is cable not receiving a similar hand-out for the same 
purpose? 
204. /d. at 35-36. 
205. Of course, one does not really get spectrum from the FCC without incurring any cost. 
Rather, costs are incurred in different form, such as filing fees and legal fees, for those seek-
ing licenses to use the spectrum. These costs, however, are unlikely to amount to the full value 
of the spectrum use license, as Kwerel and Felker have demonstrated. See id. at 121-28 (c/1/ng 
KWEREL & FELKER, USING AUcnONS TO SELECT FCC LICENSEES (1985)). 
206. TLP, supra note 6, at 129. 
207. /d. at 129-33. 
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In all of these instances, we face the dilemma of trying to judge 
the outcome of competitive markets when the game was rigged at the 
outset. Suppose we decided to let competition dictate to what extent 
people drank coffee or tea and what would be the relative prices of 
each - and then gave away coffee beans, but not tea leaves? The 
new Act, supposedly designed to make markets work in telecommunica-
tions regulation, not only does nothing to create further markets in 
spectrum, but it exacerbates some existing imbalances between wire-
based and ether-based transmitting technologies. 
Because we have no markets in spectrum use, we have had to 
invent a method to create property rights in the spectrum. This has 
been accomplished by allocating the rights to use the spectrum by ad-
ministrative fiat.208 Because the FCC has no prices for its spectrum use 
rights, it has little idea how valuable one use is as compared to anoth-
er. And, of course, the agency is susceptible to political pressures to 
favor certain technologies or services over others. 
For these reasons, administrative allocation of the electromagnetic 
spectrum has not been a shining example of what regulation can do for 
us. Nowhere is this more evident than in television broadcasting. There, 
a series of FCC decisions in the 1950's essentially confined us, unnec-
essarily, to a closed entry, three commercial network system that per-
sisted until the growth of cable made additional television broadcast 
stations and therefore additional television networks profitable.209 
To those with a detailed knowledge of the history of mis-allocation 
and mis-assignment of the television spectrum, the grant to every exist-
ing television station of an additional channel for HDTV is an irony 
that borders on the tragic. A one hundred percent increase in the 
amount of spectrum allocated to commercial television broadcasting, 
and not one single additional licensee! The new Act doubles the na-
tional resources committed to television, yet leaves the level of concen-
208. /d. at 36-38. 
209. The story of this spectrum misallocation and its effects on the number of stations and 
number and concentration of networks is laid out in summi!I)' form in MIV, supra note 6, at 
12-20. A full version is in Thomas Schuessler, Structural Barr/en to the Entry of Additional 
Television Networks: The Federal Communicalions Commission's Spectrum Management Policies, 
54 S. CAL. L. REv. 875 (1981). Perhaps it is not immedintcly obvious why cable had an im-
pact on television station viability. Briefly, cable improves (mdeed, virtually perfects) signal 
quality to the home. Station assignments that were impractical due to the comparatively poor 
signals they were authorized to transmit lost that handicap when cable was laid do\\ll in their 
areas. Because the number of television networks is simply n function of the number ond geo-
graphical distribution of viable television stations, the growth of cable nlso helped fourth (Fox), 
fifth (Paramount), and sixth (\Varner) television networks to nrisc. 
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tration in this industry completely untouched! For decades, first the 
FCC and subsequently the Congress bemoaned the virtual absence of 
minority ownership210 - and vezy small participation of women - in 
television broadcasting. Now, over 800 additional licenses are to be 
handed out, without increasing the ratio of minority or female or small 
business ownership one whit! 
The acquisition by broadcasters of an additional license (apparently 
at no charge), then, is more than a property rights grab without parallel 
in the United States since the days of our previous robber barons, the 
railroads. It is also an extraordinary denial of our professed commit-
ments to increase competition, to lower entzy barriers and to expand 
opportunities for historically excluded persons in the broadcasting indus-
tty. Ironically, it was pursuit of these commitments that was claimed to 
justify failure to rely on simple market mechanisms to allocate the 
broadcast spectrum. 
Fortunately, the consequences of this extraordinary sell-out will not 
be so dire. We now have cable. Cable networks and operators are free 
to offer high definition television today. So are DBS, MMDS, and 
videocassette entrepreneurs. More importantly, these technologies are 
technologies of plenty; they expand opportunities for program suppliers 
and open the television viewing markets to competition. Today, one 
who does not enjoy the fare produced by an oligopoly can simply tune 
out the conventional broadcasters. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that the new Act does nothing to 
redress a fundamental flaw in our competition policy in telecommunica-
tions: the competitive imbalance we create between wired and wireless 
carriers. At the same time, it exacerbates a fundamental flaw in our 
regulatory policy toward broadcasting: the use of spectrum allocation 
authority to confer market power on a closed class of privileged broad-
casters. 
2. The Problem of Universal Service 
Universal service, as defined in the new Act, and competitive mar-
kets cannot co-exist, where the goods produced have many substitutes 
or where the technology is dynamic. We are so used to universal ser-
vice in telephone markets that the point may be better illustrated from 
210. /d. at 93-96. 
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another perspective. 
Suppose government decided to establish "universal housing" by 
requiring that every third new house built be sold at twenty percent 
below its cost. What would happen? The number of new homes built 
would fall dramatically. Builders would need to price two of every 
three new houses well above cost. Purchasers would shift to the "used 
house" market (at least until they thereby drove prices in that market 
up to a new balance with the "new house" market). 
Similar shifting would occur with telecommunications. If you tell a 
telephone company to provide basic residential phone service to low in-
come neighborhoods or computer services to elementary schools at 
below cost prices, it will have to charge above cost prices to someone 
else. But that someone else will then just shift his or her purchases to 
a supplier other than the regulated telephone company. 
There are three ways around this dilemma. First, government could 
subsidize the purchase directly, from general tax funds. That is what 
we do for low income housing, but not for low income telephony, in 
the U.S. We cannot escape the "universal housing'' tax by shifting our 
purchases in the housing market. Second, government could give the 
phone company a monopoly, so that the customers to whom it would 
raise prices would have no where else to turn. That is what we used to 
do for low income and rural telephony in the U.S., when AT&T oper-
ated a fairly complete monopoly in several product lines and so was 
able to generate subsidies internally. (Indeed, the FCC knew this. It 
tried to prevent courts from authorizing competition in long distance 
precisely because AT&T, in its monopoly incarnation, could cross-sub-
sidize pro-social goals.211) 
A third option, embraced by the new Act, is to levy an equivalent 
charge on everyone in the industry and then use those funds to sub-
sidize directly the provider of the pro-social service(s). Thus, the new 
Act specifies that providers of interstate telecommunications services 
will "contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis,"212 to a 
fund that will be used to subsidize those who provide "universal ser-
vice."213 An "equitable and nondiscriminatory" fee might be, for exam-
ple, a one percent gross receipts ''tax." This is "equitable and nondis-
criminatory" in the sense that it is competitively neutral - its collec-
211. See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC [Execunet 1], 561 F.2d 36S (D.C. Cir. 1977), cerL 
denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978). 
212. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 101(a), adding 47 U.S.C. § 2S4(d). 
213. Id. § l01(a), adding 47 U.S.C. §§ 2S4(d) & (e). 
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tion should not bias consumer choices toward one seller rather than 
another. 
But, of course, this tax will bias choices. First of all, non-telecom-
munications services will become relatively more attractive. It may be 
less efficient, measured by the value of resources expended, to mail a 
letter than to make a phone call. However, due to the ''telecommunica-
tions tax," it may be less expensive to write than to call. A sensible 
consumer will choose the (personally) cheaper, but (societally) less 
efficient altemative.214 We should note, however, that this is a problem 
only to the extent that non-telecommunications information technologies 
are nearly equivalent in costs to those data transmission services that 
are subject to the tax. 
More daunting than the problem of old technologies is the problem 
of new ones. With the new Act in place, people will now have incen-
tives to create and to purchase methods of data transmission that are 
(a) not as efficient as existing telecommunications services but (b) not 
subject to the tax. To revert to the "universal housing" example, a firm 
might start selling newly constructed mobile homes and argue that they 
were not "houses" as defined in the Universal Housing Act. MCI start-
ed a long distance telephone service, but called itself a "specialized 
common carrier'' and so got to offer deals that AT&T could not.215 
Neither the· mobile home builder nor MCI would have to be more effi-
cient to succeed. Because telecommunications technology is so dynamic, 
it is difficult to conceive of a regulatory regime that treats every such 
technology and every effective substitute for it on a competitively neu-
tral basis.216 
Candidly, it is hard to argue against the concept of universal ser-
vice without sounding like someone who hates little children and peo-
ple who dwell in rural areas. But the point is not that school children 
or poor people or rural folk do not deserve or need subsidized access 
to telephone services. Rather, the point is that we have already learned 
214. Perhaps then, it was not incompetence but brilliance that led the drafters of the new Act 
to define "telecommunications" to include the act of delivering a letter from its author to a 
recipient? See supra note 4. 
215. 1LP, supra note 6, at 477-78. 
216. I am not trying to argue here that public interest regulation can never work. One might 
note, for example, that requiring seat belts in automobiles imposes a "competitively neutral" tax 
on auto makers. I agree and do not believe that this makes such a tax poor regulatory or 
market strategy. Rather, I believe the history of telecommunications regulation shows that the 
technology outruns the regulators and that, in these markets, the pro-social subsidies virtually 
always become competitive handicaps. 
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that we cannot give these benefits to them through a system of industry 
generated internal cross-subsidies unless we dictate that that industry be 
monopolized. 
I have no doubt that incumbent LECs will argue against compet-
itive entry on the grounds that such entry will retard the universal ser-
vice goals of the Act They will frequently be right. One simply cannot 
have unbundled services with nondiscriminatory access and a system of 
subsidized universal service obligations existing side by side. 
In my judgment, it is both bad competition policy and bad regula-
tory policy to try to achieve properly functioning competitive telecom-
munications markets while a regulator sees to it that these same mar-
kets generate subsidized pro-social benefits. Sadly, I suspect that many 
people in Congress know these things, but voted for the bill anyway. 
3. The Problem of Competition Analysis 
An extensive, thoughtful literature on the economics of industrial 
organization and behavior underlies current antitrust law. This literature 
teaches us that, in order to analyze the effects on competition of the 
behavior at issue, we should first define the market(s) in which the 
firm(s) operate, then detennine who controls what finns in that market, 
and then calculate the extent of concentration of control in that mar-
ket.217 These might seem obvious and elementary principles. To any 
student of antitrust they are quite simple and basic. Yet one who had 
read only the Telecommunications Act of 1996 would think that Con-
gress was completely unaware of this antitrust learning. 
a. Defining Markets 
Industrial organization economists and antitrust lawyers alike start 
with markets. They know (or believe) that we employ competition to 
discipline finns - to keep them from producing shoddy goods or re-
stricting output to raise prices. A "market'' is the group of finns that, 
with respect to any other particular finn, disciplines that finn, by 
threatening to steal its customers if the finn produces shoddy goods or 
217. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANmRUST POUCY: ntE LAW OF COMP£nTIOS AND 
llS PRAcnCE 2-17 (1994). 
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to expand output if the finn tries to raise its price. Thus, to know the 
competitive consequences of a merger or an agreement, we need to 
know the market or markets within which finns that are parties to the 
merger or agreement operate. 
With respect to telecommunications finns, it is particularly impor-
tant to distinguish between local and national markets. Conventional 
telecommunications delivery services to the home operate mostly in 
local markets. I believe it is safe to assert that no one ever moved 
from New York to Chicago to get better television reception or cable 
or telephone service. Thus, Chicago broadcasters do not discipline New 
York broadcasters in the market for selling broadcasts to listeners and 
viewers.218 
The new Act appears to recognize this principle when it removes 
all national limits on radio station ownership. But it does not remove 
them for television. Moreover, the new Act, as we have seen, greatly 
hobbles local Bell operating companies' entry into long distance tele-
phone service. But long distance service is provided in a national mar-
ket. It is at best unclear how control over a few local switched net-
works can be translated into market power in the national long distance 
market. 
b. Measuring control 
Once markets are defined, one needs to know who controls which 
finns in those markets. The new Act perpetuates a time-honored failing 
of broadcasting law in treating fonnal and infonnal integration as 
worlds apart, when they are in fact two phenomena that exist on a 
single continuum. Depending on the length and complexity of an infor-
mal, contractual relationship, it may occupy a spot on that line quite 
close to a fonnal merger. 
The new Act seems not to recognize this principle. For example, at 
one point, the bill establishes rules limiting the television stations a 
finn may own nationwide. 219 The Act does nothing, however, to limit 
the number (or collective reach) of stations with which a television 
network may affiliate nationwide. Yet, as my colleagues and I have 
218. Or, if you prefer, the market for selling ears and eyeballs to advertisers. 
219. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(c)(1), modifying 41 C.F.R 13.3555. Helpful-
ly, the limit is expressed in terms of the collective reach of those stations, not the simple num-
ber of them. 
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shown elsewhere, the distinction between a network's ownership of a 
television station and its affiliation with another is a good deal more 
formal than real.22° For example, the difference is quite small between 
the rate at which affiliated stations, on the one hand, and owned sta-
tions, on the other, clear major networks' prime time programs.221 In a 
similar vein, the new Act establishes limits on the number of radio 
stations any firm may own in one local market, but does not count as 
an "owned" station one that is staffed and programmed by another 
under a "local marketing agreement," a form of joint venture that is 
rather common in today's commercial radio broadcasting industry.222 
c. Measuring Concentration 
Conventional wisdom has it that the number of firms in a market 
is, at best, only a partial measure of the extent to which firms within it 
probably compete fiercely. Also important, certainly in markets with 
less than a dozen firms, are the percentage shares of the market that 
each firm controls. Not all firms are created equal and the impact on 
market behavior of commercial practices or mergers depends partly on 
whether the firms engaging in the questioned behavior are among those 
created more equal than others.223 
Again, the new Act largely perpetuates a method by which regula-
tors measure acceptable levels of concentration by how many stations a 
firm acquires, not by the size or power of those stations. Thus, for 
example, one firm may own eight radio stations in a market of forty-
five or more.224 This applies regardless of whether those are the most 
or least popular in the market or propagate a broad or a relatively 
narrow signal. 
A clever person might argue that, for purposes of measuring con-
centration, all stations should be treated as equal, because each has an 
equal potential to be most productive. That might explain why the new 
Act simply counts numbers for the radio multiple ownership rules, but 
would not explain why it establishes national television station owner-
220. MlV, supra note 6, at 31-93. 
221. NISS VOL. 11, supra note 18, at 260-66. 
222. FCC Rules would count such stations. TLP, supra note 6, at 271-76. 
223. HOVENKAMP, supra note 217, at 455-66. 
224. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(b)(l)(A), modifying 41 C.F.R. 733555(a). 
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ship rules based on the collective reach of the owned stations.225 
Why do I rate as "ugly" the failure of the new Act to engage in 
serious competition analysis at several points? Not, I confess, because 
this omission will do great hann to consumers. Multiple ownership of 
radio and television stations or the grounds on which BOCs are allowed 
into long distance do not seem to bear enormously on listener, viewer 
or consumer welfare. 
Rather, I object to the implications of this shoddy analysis. These 
features of the new Act seem to bespeak an absence of genuine com-
mitment to competition as the prime regulator of telecommunications 
markets. These provisions appear to reflect instead a simple private 
interest give and take, in which legislators bicker over a series of num-
bers - eight stations or seven stations per large radio market - rather 
than deliberate over an important legislative principle. Why would we 
not simply leave formal and informal consolidation to the antitrust 
authorities, as we do for most other U.S. industries and markets? 
4. The Problem of Censorship 
Lucas Powe and I recently published both a book226 and a law 
review article227 about the evils, the futility and the wastefulness of 
censorship of the electronic media.228 While neither is hot off the press, 
both are still pretty wann, so I see little need to repeat our arguments 
here. Further, I think my description, above, of the censorship features 
225. /d. § 202(c)(1), modifying 47 C.F.R. 73.3555. 
226. RBP, supra note 6, passim. 
227. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 178, passim. 
228. Both the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (Telecommunications Act of 1996 §§ 
501-509) and the Parental Choice in Television Programming (/d. § 551, 552) section are ex-
cellent examples of futile, wasteful regulation. Anyone who cares to think about it can figure 
out that no government official, bureau or commission can keep George Carlin's "Seven Dirty 
Words" off the Internet, no matter how much legislators (pretend to) wish they could. 
Similarly, common sense shows that to encode all television programming for "sexual, 
violent or other indecent material" is not a manageable task. The Motion Picture Association of 
America rates about 600 theatrical films, or about 1200 hours, every year. Let's compare the 
volume of television programming. Assume that a 70-channel cable system averages 20 hours 
of cablecasting per day. That's 1400 hours of programming every day. No one can intelligently, 
responsibly, accurately and fairly encode 1400 hours of programming every day for "program-
ming that contains sexual, violent, or other indecent material about which parents should be 
informed before it is displayed to children." See id. § 551(b)(1). 
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of the new statute229 is sufficiently non-neutral to convey my distaste 
for most of them. 
I do wish to add three points. First, as a whole, the censorship 
features of the new Act are anti-cable. The indecency rules aimed at 
the Internet cannot prove enforceable, but those aimed at cable will be. 
Further, violence has pretty much been scrubbed from conventional 
network television, but not from cable which is full of old network 
shows that had lots of violence as well as movies and cable network 
fare that are comparatively violent 230 Whether those who voted for the 
Act know it or not, it is cable that will bear the brunt of the bill's 
censorship features. 
Second, all these censorship features of the new Act - as all other 
acts of censorship- at bottom reflect hostility to the programmer's (or 
editor's) status or class or points of view. Although this is not stated in 
the new Act, we all know that the V -chip proposal is not aimed at the 
most violent fare on television - sports (especially football) and news 
coverage of crime, war, and terrorism. The indecency provisions are 
aimed at those obsessed with sexual acts, not those obsessed with racist 
hatred or religious intolerance or greed. That is, the "indecency'' target-
ed by the new Act does not include racial epithets, expressions of reli-
gious bigotcy, or advertisements for alcohol and tobacco - each of 
which may well be more damaging to young psyches than a joke about 
farting or a picture of testicles. We say we care about children, but we 
are at least equally concerned to punish speakers we dislike and to 
absolve those with whom we are familiar and comfortable. 
Third, the new Act will put some strains on existing constitutional 
jurisprudence because of the clever (too clever, perhaps?) way in which 
some of the censorship features are crafted. After telling cable operators 
that they must carry smut, then Congress tells them to segregate it. The 
Act may thus be portrayed as an attempt to shield children and to sup-
port operators' editorial preferences and control. The FCC shall manage 
the V -chip system only if the industry does not volzmtarily undertake to 
do so first. Consequently, the industry's response may be characterized 
as private, rather than governmental, action.231 Although governmental 
229. See supra text accompanying notes 140-77. 
230. RBP, supra note 6, at 123. 
231. To say that the claim is transparently preposterous, which it is, is not to say all that 
much in terms of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Remember, this is the Court that told us that a 
law that differentiated on the grounds of pregnancy did not distinguish between men and wom-
en. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). The Court also told us that a law requiring 
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censorship is forbidden by the first amendment, private censorship is 
protected by it. 232 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
I have argued that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is neither a 
miracle drug nor a poison pill for what ails our telecommunications law 
and policy. The new Act has good, bad, and ugly features. 
How does it all balance out? That depends on what matters most to 
you. I have a friend who buys and sells radio stations. At any given 
time, he owns lots of them. He told me that the V -chip was the best 
thing to happen to him in years. Why? Because, he believes, the pres-
ence of the V -chip sections got the White House interested in support-
ing the bill, so my friend got expanded radio group ownership rules. 
What matters most to me? Two things. First, I think it is downright 
shameful to pretend to enact a pro-competition policy, while continuing 
to preserve the worst features of our old spectrum allocation policies, 
exacerbating the anti-competitive, anti-efficiency effects of universal 
service policy, and steadfastly refusing to ask (or to require the FCC to 
ask) real questions about real competitive conditions in real markets. 
My objection is not simply to the inelegance or intellectual shallowness 
of these policies, but to the real harms they threaten to the goal of 
competition: serving consumers efficiently. No one of these failings is 
likely to cause "pretend competitive" markets to perform badly, but in 
combination they may do much harm. 
My second large objection to the new Act stems from the fact that 
I continue to believe that the case has never been made for maintaining 
a large, independent agency with industry-specific powers over telecom-
munications firms and markets. Perhaps we need a Federal Spectrum 
Commission to manage spectrum assignment and to mediate interference 
claims. Certainly, we need a Telecommunications Bureau to represent 
us in international negotiations over frequency use and assignments. We 
may need an Interconnection Department (or just an amendment to the 
antitrust laws) to establish the principle that local telecommunications 
carriers that possess market power must provide sophisticated and non-
separate seating, by race, on public transportation facilities provided both blacks and whites the 
equal protection of the laws. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown 
v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 494 (1954). 
232. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that New Hampshire residents 
cannot be forced to display "Live Free or Die" on their license plates). 
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discriminatory access to other providers of allied or competing telecom-
munications services. But what other sound, important public policies 
are reflected in the 1934 Communications Act or the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 that cannot be pursued by agencies - like the FTC, 
the SEC, the NLRB - that are not industry specific and so are much 
less susceptible to capture by private interests? Without the Communi-
cations Act, neither Congress nor its constituents would assume that 
government is charged with superintending communications in this 
country. 
These seem to be the larger questions that a true reform of U.S. 
telecommunications law and policy would address. The 1996 Act not 
only failed to address these questions, but created an even larger Feder-
al Communications Commission, charged with even more responsibili-
ties. One Commissioner reports that the new law will require the FCC 
to conduct eighty rulemakings!233 One reads the new Act in vain for 
something that reflects Congressional awareness that the FCC may not 
be omnipotent, its commissioners not omniscient. I find it difficult to 
see how such an enlargement of the FCC and its duties can be squared 
with a determination to reduce the extent of government management 
of telecommunications and to increase the role of competition - i.e., 
discipline inflicted by consumers - on the industry.234 
Finally, and perhaps most fortunately, I believe we can be quite 
sure that all the matters I have raised in this Article are relatively short 
term transitory issues. Telecommunications technology marches forward. 
We cannot retard it any more than we can catch lightning in a bottle. 
Some people are now using the Internet for long distance phone calls. 
Who knows what technologies will dominate in 2025? Just as we now 
snicker and guffaw over earlier attempts to regulate the telephone in-
dustry through the Kingsbury Commitment of 1913 and the AT&T 
consent decree of 1956,235 so will our grandchildren wonder what all 
this fuss was about. 
U.S. governments, both state and federal, have erected countless 
entry barriers in the course of writing and rewriting telecommunications 
233. FCC Comm'r Susan Ness, Remarks at the Public Policy Forum Series, Whmton School. 
U. Penn (Feb. 22, 1996) (transcript available at hUp:l/www.fcc.gov/SpeechcsiNessfspsn604.txt). 
Note, further, that a single rulemaking may well spawn dozens of individual rules. We arc 
certainly looking at over 1,000 new FCC rules as a result of the new Act 
234. For some years now, a soft drink has promoted itself as "The Uneola." Perhaps v.-e 
might call the new Act the "Un-deregulation bill." 
235. 1LP, supra note 6, 468-71. 
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laws. Not one of them has withstood the critical analysis of those 
blessed with hindsight. Technological change has circumvented them 
all. To oversimplify one final time, to the extent that the new Act 
destroys entry barriers, I would judge it a success while, to the extent 
that it creates or strengthens them, I would judge it a failure. 
